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INTRODUCTION
Eyewitness identifications are notoriously unreliable. The Su-
preme Court has observed that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness iden-
tification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with
instances of mistaken identification." 1 Numerous other courts have
expounded upon the unreliability of eyewitness identification evi-
dence, 2 and scholarly commentators and psychologists have dem-
I United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Dowmng, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1985); People
v. Riley, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Kan.
1981); see also United States v. Butler, 636 F.2d 727, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting) ("memory is an active, constructive process that often introduces inaccu-
racies by adding details not present in the initial representation or in the event itself."),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981).
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onstrated that the courts' concerns are well-placed. 3 Eyewitness
identification evidence "has been thought by many experts to pres-
ent what is conceivably the greatest single threat to the achievement
of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished." ' 4 Yet, not-
withstanding its well-recogmzed unreliability, -eyewitness identifi-
cation testimony is featured frequently and prominently in criminal
trials.
To avoid the injustice that nught occur on account of the
unreliability and prevalence of such testimony, in the 1967 case of
Stovall v Denno,5 the Supreme Court held that a criminal defen-
dant has a due process right to exclude evidence derived from
improper pretrial identification procedures. In a series of cases
following Stovall and culrmnating in Manson v Brathwaite in
1977,6 however, the Supreme Court considerably weakened the
right to due process. 7 Since these later cases, the lower federal
courts and state courts have enforced the defendant's right only in
the most egregious situations . Today, the due process right is little
more than a dead letter and affords criminal defendants almost
none of the protections that it was originally intended to provide.
The purposes of this Article are to survey the demise of the
right to due process, to analyze the problems that beset it today,
and to set forth a new role for the right. Part I surveys the Supreme
Court cases from Stovall to Brathwaite and demonstrates that,
originally, the right to due process protected the criminal defen-
dant's rights to fair pretrial procedures, but over time the Supreme
Court began to focus less on the fairness of the pretrial procedures
ISee, e.g., E. LoFrus, EYEwrN;m TESnmoNY (1979); J. SHEPmRD, H. ELDS & G.
DAVIES, IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION (1982); P WA, EY-
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRUMiNAL CASES (1965); G. WELLS & E. LoFrus, Eymrnwss
TEsTIMoNy (1984); Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 395 (1987); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identifi-
cation: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079, 1079 (1973); A. YARMEY,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEawrnss TEsimoNY (1979).
4 McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REV 235, 238 (1970) (citing authority); see also Jonakait, Reliable Identification:
Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v. Brathwaite?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv 511, 528
(1981).
, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
6 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
1 Unless the context clearly reqmres a different reading, references to the "right to
due process" should be understood to mean the right to due process in connection with
pretrial identification procedures, and not the right to due process in general or in any
other situation.8 See infra notes 102-49 and accompanying text.
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and more on the reliability of the outcomes of those procedures.9
The Court, rather than asking whether pretrial identification pro-
cedures were fair, asked simply whether the evidence produced was
reliable. As long as the Court determined that the evidence was
reliable, no due process violation existed.
Part II identifies three problems with the Supreme Court's
approach that render it unworkable. 10 The first problem is that the
method that the Supreme Court has developed for determining the
accuracy of eyewitness evidence is founded upon incorrect scientific
principles and upon purported facts that are both inaccurate and
misleadingly incomplete. The divergence between the Supreme
Court's precepts and the lessons of science creates an unsound legal
doctrine. The second problem is that, because the Supreme Court
has given almost no instruction as to how the right is to be applied,
it has been confusingly and inconsistently applied by the lower
federal courts and state courts. The courts' treatment of the right
creates a doctrinal chaos, the principal result of which is a right
that is of little value for criminal defendants. The third problem
with the right to due process is that, because it focuses exclusively
on the reliability of evidence rather than the method used to collect
the evidence, it ignores important values that the Constitution must
protect, in particular the value of procedural fairness. Part II also
includes a brief discussion of the development of the criminal
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. The dis-
cussion demonstrates that the right to due process m connection
with pretrial identification procedures and the right to confronta-
tion have developed along similar lines, and their current weak-
nesses may have similar origins.
Part III proposes a new formulation of the right to due process
m connection with pretrial identification procedures, one that would
avoid the problems identified in Part II." The proposed formula-
tion has two parts. First, it bars from evidence any testimony that
is derived from unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification pro-
cedures. Tis part of the formulation protects the defendant's right
to procedural fairness. Second, it gives the defendant a right to
introduce expert testimony to enable the jury to better evaluate
eyewitness identification testimony. This part of the formulation
9 See infra notes 12-73 and accompanying text.
"0 See infra notes 74-189 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 190-244 and accompanying text.
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protects the defendant's right to have used against him only such
evidence as may be rationally evaluated by the jury.
I. THm DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGr TO DUE PROCESS iN
CONNECTION WITH PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
This Part briefly reviews the development of the right to due
process in the Supreme Court. Though the right as initially con-
ceived was intended to uphold the fairness of pretrial identification
procedures, the focus of the Court has gradually shifted away from
procedural fairness to the reliability of the evidence denied from
the pretrial procedures. Currently, if the evidence bears sufficient
indicia of reliability, no due process violation has occured.
A. The Supreme Court's Decisions from Stovall v Denno
Through Coleman v Alabama
1. Stovall v. Denno
Until 1967, the Supreme Court had never considered whether
a pretrial identification procedure could implicate the defendant's
right to due process. Stovall v Denno12 was the first case in which
the Court considered whether, and under what circumstances, pre-
trial procedures might raise due process issues. In Stovall, the
defendant, who was suspected of murder, was exhibited on the day
after the crime, alone and handcuffed, before the only living
eyewitness of the crime. 13 Since the eyewitness had been stabbed
eleven times and was in the hospital for major surgery, the con-
frontation was held in the eyewitness's hospital room. The eyewit-
ness identified the defendant, and that pretrial identification was
admitted into evidence at the subsequent trial, as well as an in-
court identification by the same witness. 1 4
The defendant was not represented by counsel at the hospital,
and the main issue in the case was whether the defendant's right
to counsel at certain pretrial identification procedures-which right
had been announced the same day as the Stovall decision, in United
States v Wade,'5 and Gilbert v California'6-had been violated.
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
A confrontation in which only one suspect is shown to a witness is called a "show-
up." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1980).
" Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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After extensive analysis, the Court held that the newly minted right
to counsel should not be applied retroactively, and thus the defen-
dant's right to counsel had not been violated. 17
Following that analysis, the Court turned to the issue of whether
the pretrial identification "was so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the defen-
dant] was denied due process of law."' 8 The Court asserted that
denial of due process "is a recognized ground of attack upon- a
conviction independent of any right to counsel claim,"' 9 and it
observed that "[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to persons
for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has
been widely condemned."' 2 Nevertheless, the Court held that the
existence of a due process violation "depends on the totality of
the circumstances" and that the totality of the circumstances did
not indicate that a due process violation occured. 2i The Court noted
that although the show-up had been suggestive, it was necessary
because the eyewitness was the 'only person in the world who
could possibly exonerate' the defendant, and no one knew how
long the eyewitness would live,2 because of her injuries suffered
during the crime. Significantly, given the subsequent development
of the law, the Court did not consider whether the eyewitness's
pretrial or in-court identifications were reliable or to what degree
they had been improperly influenced by the show-up.
Stovall was a landmark case. The Supreme Court had never
before applied due process analysis to the admissibility of eyewit-
ness identification testimony Indeed, the Court observed, "[t]he
overwhelming majority of American courts have always treated the
evidence question not as one of admissibility but as one of credi-
bility for the jury "23 Although the Court's application of due
process to pretrial identification procedures was novel, the Court
presented it almost casually, stating that due process was a "rec-
11 See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296-301.
Is Id. at 301-02.
9 Id. at 302 (citing Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966)).
20 Id. (footnote omitted).
21 Id.
2 Id. (quoting the lower court opinion, United States v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735
(2d Cir. 1966) (en banc)).
Id. at 299-300; see also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968)
(noting that until Stovall and its companion cases, "the matter of an extra-judicial identi-




ognized ground"'24 for excluding the results of suggestive pretrial
identification procedures. The Court cited only one lower court
case for the proposition that due process was a "recognized
ground,"21 and that case was outweighed by numerous cases hold-
ing that pretrial identification procedures went to the weight of
identification testimony, not its admissibility. 26 Perhaps inevitably
the ramifications of Stovall were not immediately clear. Two issues
in particular called for elucidation.
First, on account of the terseness of the Court's enunciation
of the right to due process m connection with pretrial identification
procedures, it was hard to discern the rationale or theoretical basis
for the new right. On the one hand, the rationale might be simply
that the admission of unreliable evidence violated due process; the
right mght be protecting an evidentiary interest. On the other
hand, the Court's emphasis on the distinction between necessarily
and unnecessarily suggestive procedures suggested that another fac-
tor was at work. If the reliability of the evidence were the only
interest at stake, it would not matter whether a pretrial procedure
was necessarily or unnecessarily suggestive; that it was suggestive
would be the only thing that counted. The Court never explained
what additional factor was at work.
The-second issue was whether the same constitutional test would
apply to the admissibility of pretrial identifications and in-court
identifications. In United States v Wade and Gilbert v California,
the Court held that a pretrial identification of a suspect that was
the product of an identification procedure conducted without coun-
sel was inadmissible per se, but that a subsequent in-court identi-
fication would be admissible if the government could demonstrate
"by clear and convincing evidence" that the witness had an "in-
dependent source" for the identification, i.e., a source independent
of the unconstitutional pretrial identification procedure. 27 Stovall
dealt with the introduction into evidence of both types of identi-
fication and never expressly distinguished between them. Thus,
14 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
Id. (citing Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966)).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1966) (en banc)
("As a matter of law, the method of identification inside or outside the courtroom would
go to the weight to be attributed to the identification; not to the admissibility or constitu-
tionality of testimony relating thereto."), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
17 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-43 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263, 269-74 (1967).
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some courts interpreted Stovall as imposing a single test on all
identification testimony: If the testimony was reliable, it would be
adnussible. 21 Other courts, preferring to read Stovall consistently
with Wade and Gilbert, interpreted Stovall as establishing a two-
tiered constitutional test analogous to the Wade/Gilbert formula-
tion: a pretrial identification would be inadmissible if it was the
product of an unnecessarily suggestive procedure, but a subsequent
in-court identification would be admissible if it had an independent
source. 29 •
2. Simmons v United States
The next case in which the Court applied the principles set
forth in Stovall v Denno was Simmons v United States.30 In
Simmons, the Court upheld a robbery conviction based on in-court
identifications even though the in-court witnesses had been shown
photographs of the defendant before trial in suggestive circum-
stances that might have tainted the in-court identifications.3 Sim-
mons considered the question of whether the suggestive pretrial
procedure had irreparably tainted the in-court identification so as
to make the identification at trial unreliable. In finding that the
in-court identification was not irreparably tainted by the suggestive
pretrial identification procedure, the Court relied on the circum-
stances surrounding the bank robbery and the details of the sug-
gestive photo display 32
Although Simmons purported to apply Stovall straightfor-
wardly, it modified the Stovall analysis in two ways. First, Sim-
See Note, Identification: Unnecessary Suggestiveness May Not Violate Due Process,
73 CoLum. L. REv. 1168, 1174 & n.48 (1973) (citing cases).
2 See, e.g., Brathwaite v. Manson, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Smith v. Corner, 473 F.2d
877, 880-83 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom., Wallace v. Smith, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973);
Rudd v. Florida, 477 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1973); Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d
1230, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 (1969); United States v. Clark, 294
F Supp. 44 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom., Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Choice, 235 A.2d 173, 174 (Pa.
1967) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); see also.United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d
912, 914 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting the issue but not deciding it); Note, supra note 28, at
1172-74 ("the difficult question is whether 'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification'
is to be a criterion independent of 'unnecessarily suggested') (quoting Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)).
- 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
3' Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 382-83, 386 n.6. (1968) (the pretrial photo
identification had not been admitted into evidence).
12 Id. at 385.
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mons cast doubt on the relevance of the distinction between
"necessarily suggestive" and "unnecessarily suggestive" proce-
dures. In Stovall, the Court's analysis ended when the Court de-
termined that the show-up procedure had been necessary, and the
finding in Simmons that the photo identification procedure was
necessary ight have ended its analysis, too. That the Simmons
Court nevertheless continued its analysis suggested that the distinc-
tion was not constitutionally significant. Furthermore, in Stovall,
the suggestive show-up had been held to be necessary because the
eyewitness was the only one to the crime and was in imnumnent
danger of dying.33 No similarly compelling circumstance existed in
Simmons, yet the Court was satisfied that the photo identification
procedure, although suggestive, was necessarily so:
[I]t is not suggested that it was unnecessary for the FBI to resort
to photographic identification in this instance. A serious felony
had been committed. The perpetrators were still at large. The
inconclusive clues which law enforcement officials possessed led
to [the defendants]. It was essential for the FBI agents swiftly to
determine whether they were on the right track so that they could
properly deploy their forces in Chicago and, if necessary, alert
officials in other cities. 34
Clearly the factors cited by the Court-the seriousness of the
felony, the fact that the defendants were still at large, and the
need for the FBI to "properly deploy their forces"-are far broader
than the circumstances in Stovall. If applied consistently they would
cloak many suggestive pretrial procedures under the protective
mantle of necessity
Second, Simmons had a different tone than Stovall and sug-
gested that the Court would not vigorously uphold the defendant's
right to due process. The Simmons Court noted that the danger of
misidentification could be "substantially lessened" by cross-exam-
mation at trial before a jury 15 This statement signalled a retreat
to the pre-Stovall doctrine that the suggestiveness of pretrial iden-
tification procedures went to the weight, not the adrmssibility, of
the evidence produced. 36 Whereas the Stovall Court had inveighed
against unnecessarily suggestive procedures that were "conducive"
" Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.
"Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384-85.
31 Id. at 384.
3Stovall, 388 U.S. at 299-300.
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to irreparable nstaken identifications, Simmons stated that the
due process clause proscribed only evidence that was the product
of unnecessarily suggestive procedures that "give nse to a very
substantial likelihood" of irreparable nmsidentification. 37 "Condu-
cive" is a lesser standard than "very substantial likelihood," and
therefore Simmons appeared to signal a weakemng .of the right to
due process announced in Stovall. 3
3. Foster v California
Foster v California39 was the next case in which the Court
applied the due process analysis to pretrial identification proce-
dures. It was the first-and to date only-case in wich the Court
reversed a conviction on due process grounds because of pretrial
identification procedures. In Foster, the defendant had been exhib-
ited in two lineups. The first lineup included only three people, the
defendant was at least six inches taller than the other two, and
only the defendant wore a leather jacket as the assailant was alleged
to have worn. The witness could not positively identify the defen-
dant, although the witness "thought" that the defendant was the
assailant. After the lineup, the witness met with the defendant
alone, face-to-face, and was still unsure whether the defendant was
the assailant. The next week, the defendant was in a second lineup
with five participants; the defendant was the only person in the
second lineup who had also been in the first lineup. At the second
lineup, the witness was certain that the defendant was the assailant.
The witness testified to both of these identifications and made an
in-court identification of the defendant.4 Relying on Stovall v
Denno, the Court held that the defendant's right to due process
had been violated because "the pretrial confrontations clearly were
so arranged as to make the resulting identifications virtually inev-
itable." 41
Compare Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (the relevant inquiry in Stovall was whether the
conduct was "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification")
with Simmons, 390 U.S. at 382 (The case turned on whether the act was so impermissibly
suggestive as to "give nse to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable nusidentification.").
1, See Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's
Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. RPv 1097, 1108 (1974).
39 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
- Foster v. Califorma, 394 U.S. 440, 440-42 (1969).
41 Id. at 443 ("The suggestive elements of this identification procedure made it all but




Perhaps because the underlying facts were so extreme, Foster
was a short, almost cursory, opinion. The pretrial procedures were
undoubtedly suggestive, and their suggestiveness was clearly unnec-
essary Although Foster did not clarify the analysis, it served to
highlight two issues in the Stovall-Simmons right to due process.
The first issue, raised by the Foster Court in a footnote, was the
relationship between the right to due process and the role of the
jury-
The reliability of properly admitted eyewitness identification, like
the credibility of other parts of the prosecution's case, is a matter
for the jury But it is the teaching of Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall
that in some cases the procedures leading to an eyewitness iden-
tification may be so defective as to make the identification con-
stitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law 42
The problem is that Stovall, Simmons and Foster did not identify
when the jury could hear the evidence and when it could not, or
what procedures were "so defective" that they were unconstitu-
tional and what ones were, although defective, not so egregious as
to bar the jury from receiving the evidence that they produced.
None of the cases had reconciled the right to due process in
connection with pretrial identification procedures and the historical
and constitutional role of the jury in crimnal trials. As Justice
Black argued in dissent, the Court's application of the due process
analysis to pretrial identification procedures threatened to usurp
the constitutionally established role of the jury 43
The second issue concerned the distinction between pretrial
identifications and in-court identifications. The Court remanded
the case, but it was not clear whether, on retrial, the prosecution
would be entitled to enter the witness's in-court identification into
12 Foster, 394 U.S. at 442 n.2 (1969).
41 Id. at 447 (Black, J., dissenting):
Of course it is an incontestable fact in our judicial history that the jury is the
sole tribunal to weigh and determine facts. That means that the jury must, if
we keep faith with the Constitution, be allowed to hear eyewitnesses and
decide for itself whether it can recogmze the truth and whether they-are telling
the truth. It means that the jury must be allowed to decide for itself whether
the darkness of the night, the weakness of the witness' eyesight, or any other
factor impaired the witness' ability to make an accurate identification. To take
that power away from the jury is to rob it of the responsibility to perform
the precise functions the Founders most wanted it to perform.
Justice Black had made the same point in Simmons. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 395 (Black,
J., concurnng in part and dissenting in part) ("The weight of the evidence is not a
question for the Court but for the jury ").
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evidence, or whether the pretnal lineup identifications had so tainted
the in-court identification that the m-court identification was also
inadmissible. This problem, also noted by Justice Black in his
dissent, 44 suggested that perhaps the Court was not dedicated to
applying separate tests to pretrial and in-court identifications.
4. Coleman v Alabama
In Coleman v. Alabama,45 the Court applied a due process
analysis and held that a pretrial lineup in which a witness made
an identification of the defendants was not so unduly prejudicial
so as "fatally to taint" 4 the witness's in-court identifications of
the defendants. The defendants argued that the lineup procedure
was unconstitutional for a number of reasons; 47 of particular rel-
evance here, one of the defendants argued that the lineup procedure
violated his right to due process because he was the only lineup
participant wearing a hat, as had one of the attackers. 48 The Court
rejected the defendants' arguments on the ground that the tnal
court "could find" that the witness's in-court identifications had
been "entirely based upon [his] observations at the time of the
assault and not at all induced by the conduct of the lineup. ' 49 The
Court rejected the argument about the'hat on the grounds that
even though the hat may have made the lineup suggestive, the
defendant wore the hat of 'his own volition, and, in any event, the
record suggested that the hat was not important to the witness's
selection of that defendant. 50 This represented a retreat from Fos-
4 Foster, 394 U.S. at 444-45 (Black, J., dissenting).
41 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
4 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 4 (1970) (as in Simmons, the pretrial identification
was apparently not entered into evidence, and the only issue therefore, was whether the
pretrial identification "tainted" the subsequent in-court identification); see Coleman v.
State, 211 So.2d 917, 921 (Ala. 1968), vacated and remanded sub nom., Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
4" In particular, the defendants based their constitutional argument on the facts that
(1) the witness testified that when he went in for the line-up he was under the assumption
the police had apprehended his attackers, and (2) the defendants were the only lineup
participants who were forced to say the same words as the assailant.
4 Coleman, 399 U.S. at 6.
4" Id. at 5-6. The Court also rejected the arguments on the grounds that (1) even if
the witness believed that there were suspects in the lineup, the police had not prompted the
witness to select the defendants, and (2) the record was unclear whether only the defendants
or all of the lineup participants spoke the words that the assailant had allegedly spoken. In
any event the record suggested that the witness might have identified the defendants even
before they had said anything.
" Id. at 6.
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ter, in which the Court had found that the defendant's leather
jacket was one of the factors making the lineup unconstitutionally
suggestive, even though there had been no evidence that the police
had forced the defendant to wear the jacket.-" The Court's second
argument about the hat-that the. record suggested that the hat
was not important to the witness's selection of the defendant-was
contrary to the Court's expressed concerns in Wade. The only
evidence that the hat might not have been important to the wit-
ness's selection of the defendant was the witness's own testimony 52
But in Wade, the Court had observed that witnesses could not be
counted upon to identify what made them select a person in a
pretrial identification procedure.5 1
Coleman, like Foster, did not contain substantial analysis, and
therefore generally has been glossed over by commentators.5 4 But
Coleman demonstrated how precipitously the right to due process
was weakened in the three years after its inception. For example,
in addition to the Court's treatment of the issue of the hat, the
Court's statement that the trial court "could find" that the lineup
was irrelevant to the witness's in-court identification contrasts
sharply with the. Wade Court's insistence just three years before
that the pretrial identification was a "critical step" in the trial that
could affect subsequent identifications. 55
Coleman left the right to due process in a state of weakness.
Soon after the right's inception in Stovall, signs indicated that the
Court was becoming less concerned about the dangers of improper
procedures and erroneous identifications. The contrast in treatment
of the articles of clothing in Foster and Coleman, and the contrast
between Wade's and Coleman's degree of concern about the effect
of a suggestive pretrial procedure on a subsequent in-court identi-
fication, attest to the declining status of the right.
, See Foster, 394 U.S. at 443.
SZ Coleman, 399 U.S. at 6.
" See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 ("Neither witnesses nor lineup
participants are likely to be schooled in the detection of suggestive influences.").
14 See, e.g., Pulaski, supra note 38, at 1110-11.
1 Id. at 229 (once a witness has selected a person from a pretnal identification
procedure, "he is not likely to go back on his word later on"). Scientific evidence confirms
that once an eyewitness makes a selection, he tends to "anchor" to it, and is unlikely to
change his mind. See, e.g., Hall, Loftus & Tousignant, Postevent Information and Changes
in Recollection for a Natural Event, in G. WEus & E. Lorrus, supra note 3, at 128; Gross,




In addition to doctrinal weakness, the analysis of the right was
also confused. At the core of the confusion was the question that
had been unanswered since Stovall: whether the purpose of the
right was to guarantee the reliability of eyewitness identifications
or to protect against abusive procedures. Did the right focus on
the outcomes of procedures or on the procedures themselves? This
unresolved question led to additional questions. The first such
question concerned the role of the concept of necessity in the due
process analysis: if the right was focused on outcomes rather than
procedures, then the concept of necessity would have no place, but
if it was a procedural right, then necessity could be a significant
factor in.the analysis. A second question concerned the relationship
between the right to due process and the role of the jury The
Court had never responded to Justice Black's argument that the
reliability of all testimony, including eyewitness testimony, was for
the jury to decide, and therefore, judicial exclusion of pretrial
identifications usurped the role of the jury A third question was
whether the same standard applied to pretrial identifications and
in-court identifications. Stovall-interpreted in light of Wade and
Gilbert-suggested that different ,standards existed for these two
situations, but Foster had muddied the waters
The Court's next two cases helped resolve some of these issues.
Most importantly, the cases definitively established that the right
to due process focused solely on the reliability of the outcome, not
procedural fairness. These cases also established that whether a
pretrial procedure was necessarily suggestive or unnecessarily sug-
gestive was irrelevant. Additionally, they established that the same
standard applied to both pretrial and in-court identifications.
B. Neil v Biggers and Manson v Brathwaite
The issue in Neil v Biggers 6 was whether a show-up identifi-
cation procedure in the police station was so suggestive that the
admission into evidence of the resulting identification violated the
defendant's right to due process. The only question in the case
concerned the admssibility of the pretrial identification of the
defendant; the in-court identification was not challenged.57 In an-
swering this question, the Court reviewed Stovall, Simmons, Foster,
and Coleman and purported to draw "guidelines" from them
409 U.S. 188 (1972).
" Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1972).
[VOL. 79
PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
concermng the relationship between suggestiveness and msidenti-
fication. 58 In fact, the Court did not draw guidelines from those
cases, but erased many of the distinctions that those cases had
suggested, and inserted a single test for all eyewitness identification
evidence.
The most important new rule established by Biggers was that
the right to due process would focus solely on outcomes, not on
pretrial procedures. The Court stated, "It is the likelihood of
misidentification wich violates a defendant's right to due process
Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they in-
crease the likelihood of misidentification. . "9 Having estab-
lished the outcome-focus of the right, it followed that no basis to
distinguish between necessarily suggestive procedures and unnec-
essarily suggestive ones existed, because the necessity of the sug-
gestiveness is irrelevant to the reliability of the identification. 60 It
also followed that no different standard was to be applied to
pretrial identifications and in-court identifications, 6' and that due
process did not require that every pretrial identification that was
the product of an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification
procedure be excluded from evidence. 62 Instead, the Court held
that due process required the exclusion of pretrial identifications
only if (a) the pretrial identification procedure was suggestive (re-
gardless whether it was necessarily or unnecessarily so) and (b) the
identification was unreliable. 63 The Court indicated that whether a
pretrial identification was reliable depended upon a "totality of
the circumstances" test, 64 and identified five factors to be consid-
ered in applying that test:
[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of
misidentification include [1] the opportunity of the witness to
view the crimnal at the time of the crime, [2] the witness' degree
of attention, [3] the accuracy of the witness' prior description of
the cnrmnal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time between the crime
and the confrontation. 65
1 Id. at 198.
19 Id. at 198.
60 Id. at 198-99.
61 Id. at 198.
61 Id. at 199.
6 Id. at 198-99.
6, Id. at 199.
Id. at 199-200. Although the Supreme Court stated that the factors to be considered
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Applying the test in Biggers, the Court held that although the
show-up had been suggestive, the witness's pretrial identification
was not unreliable and could be admitted into evidence without
violating due process.6
In Manson v Brathwaite,67 the Court reaffirmed Biggers' em-
phatic focus on the reliability of all identifications-both pretnal
and in-court-as the sole determinant of their admissibility 6 The
Court also reaffirmed that the two-step test enunciated in Biggers
was applicable to all pretrial identifications because it best achieved
the goal of due process analysis of pretrial identification proce-
dures-promoting reliable eyewitness identifications. 69 TheCourt
stated defimtively- "[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony The factors to be
considered are set out in Biggers.'"70
In addition to reaffirming the lesson of Biggers, Manson dem-
onstrated that the Court did not believe that reliability was a value
of great constitutional significance. The Court stated that the right
to due process in connection with pretrial identification procedures
"protect[ed] an evidentiary interest" and noted "the limited extent
of that interest in our adversary system." 7 1 The reason that relia-
bility was not an important constitutional value, the Court ex-
"include" the five enumerated factors, the lower federal courts have almost unanimously
relied upon only those factors set forth in Biggers. See infra note 117 and accompanying
text.
Id. at 199-201.
6 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
61 At issue in Manson was whether the Biggers two-step analysis applied to pretrial
identifications that occurred after Stovall, or whether a stricter, one-step test-pursuant to
which any pretnal identifications that were the product of unnecessarily suggestive proce-
dures would be excluded from evidence regardless whether the identifications were reliable-
was applicable to such identifications. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977).
The issue arose out of an ambiguous passage in Biggers, in which the Court had observed
that applying the strict, one-step rule to procedures that occurred pre-Stovall (as did the
one in Biggers) would not be appropriate. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. Tlus led the
petitioners in Manson to argue that Biggers had implied that the stricter rule was appropriate
for procedures occurring post-Stovall. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 109.
"Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
-o Id., see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981) ("It is the reliability of
identification evidence that primarily deternmnes its admissibility") (citing Manson v. Brath-
waite, 432 U.S. at 113-14 and United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 402-04
(7th Cir. 1975)). The Manson Court also refined slightly the Biggers five-factor test by
noting that "[a]gainst these [five] factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the
suggestive identification itself." Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
7' Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 (emphasis in original), referred to Clemons v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Leventhal, J., concurrng), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 964 (1969).
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plained, was that "[c]ounsel can both cross-examine the
identification witnesses and argue in summation as to factors caus-
ing doubts as to the accuracy of the identification including ref-
erence to any suggestability in the identification procedure and any
countervailing testimony such as an alibi." 7 2 Echoing Justice Black's
opinions in Foster and Simmons, the Court observed that "evi-
dence with some degree of untrustworthmess is customary grist for
the jury mill." 73
II. TiiL FALUmRE OF THE FrvE-FACTOR RELIABILITY TEST
This Part discusses several problems concerning the right .to
due process as formulated by the Supreme Court. These problems
may be divided into three categories.
The first category of problems concerns the five reliability
factors identified by the Supreme Court in Neil v Biggers74 and
Manson v Brathwate.75 Overwhelmng scientific evidence demon-
strates that these factors are not valid predictors of the reliability
of eyewitness testimony. Based upon incorrect scientific principles,
the Supreme Court's test demonstrates the danger in erecting a
constitutional right upon a scientific foundation that is unstable
and evolving.
The second category of problems concerns the application of
Biggers and Manson by the inferior federal courts and the state
courts, whose applications have often been confused and doctri-
nally troubling. In particular, (1) because the Supreme Court failed
to define the concept of suggestiveness, the inferior federal courts
and state courts have been inconsistent about the threshold question
of when a procedure is suggestive, (2) the courts also have been
inconsistent in their determinations of when identification evidence
is reliable, and have frequently admitted evidence even in egregious
circumstances, (3) the courts have often confused (a) their deter-
minations of whether identification testimony could constitutionally
be admitted into evidence with (b) their evaluations of whether the
defendant was guilty, thus violating the cardinal principle that both
the guilty and the innocent are entitled to the same constitutional
rights, and (4) the courts have occasionally failed to distinguish
7 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 n.14 (quoting Clemons, 408 F.2d at 1251 (Leventhal, J.,
concumng)).
" Id. at 116.
- 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
75 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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whether their analyses were pursuant to the right to due process
or the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Third, even if the Supreme Court could develop a scientifically
unassailable reliability test, and the inferior federal courts and the
state courts could apply that test flawlessly, the right to due process
in connection with pretrial identification procedures still would be
fatally defective because it would be radically incomplete. Since
the Supreme Court has held that the sole value underlying the right
is reliability, the critically important interest of procedural fairness
in pretrial identification procedures is unprotected.
A. The Infirmities of the Five-Factor Reliability Test
The five-factor reliability test that the Supreme Court set forth
in Biggers and Manson is not a satisfactory method of measuring
reliability Psychological studies demonstrate that each of the fac-
tors identified by the Court, and subsequently applied by the
inferior federal courts and state courts, is either unsupported as a
scientific matter or dangerously incomplete. Moreover, a host of
other factors exist, not all of which are understood, that may
influence the reliability of an eyewitness identification. 76
1. The Certainty of Eyewitness Identification
According to the Supreme Court, the more certain the eyewit-
ness is of an identification, the more likely the identification is
reliable.7 7 Lower courts have relied upon this factor in carrying out
their due process analyses.7 8 Scientific evidence conclusively estab-
lishes, however, that there is absolutely no correlation between an
76 The following account of the infirmities of each of the factors of the five-factor
test is by no means exhaustive. There is considerable scientific literature about the unrelia-
bility of, and factors relating to, eyewitness identifications. See, e.g., Wells & Murray,
What Can Psychology Say About the Neil v. Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness
Accuracy?, 68 J. APP PsYcH. 347 (1983); Jonakait, Reliable Identification: Could the
Supreme Court Tell in Manson v. Brathwaite?, 52 U.'Coo. L. REv. 511 (1981); Levine &
Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U.
PA. L. REv 1079 (1973) (citing authorities). This section presents only a small sample of
that literature but is sufficient to demonstrate the scientific invalidity of the five-factor test.
7 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 115; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
798 See, e.g., Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 245-47 (2d Cir. 1982); Solomon v.
Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1185-86 (2d Cir. 1981).
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eyewitness's level of certainty in an identification and the correct-
ness of an identification. 79
2. The Accuracy of the Eyewitness's Description
A second factor identified by the Supreme Court and relied
upon by other courts is the "accuracy of the witness's prior de-
scription of the crinmnal." '80 As stated, this factor is circular: it
assumes that the defendant is m fact the assailant. To avoid the
problem of circularity, this factor must be interpreted to mean that
an identification that is the product of a pretrial identification
procedure is more reliable if the witness's description of the as-
sailant before viewing the identification procedure matches the
person that the witness selects at the procedure.81 Put differently,
"[t]he prior description criterion should be rephrased so that it
refers to similarity between prior description and defendant char-
acteristics. "82
Even so interpreted, the prior description criterion fails to
conform to scientific evidence, which suggests that there is not an
"appreciable relationship between a person's prior description of
a face and the person's accuracy in identifying the face." ' 83 As one
-study notes, "[a]lthough faces easily evoke verbal labels as word
associates, ease of labeling was not related to accuracy of facial
recognition. [O]bservers' ability to verbally describe faces is
not predictive of their ability to recogmze these faces.''
3. The Eyewitness's Degree of Attention
The eyewitness's degree of attention during the crimnal inci-
dent is unquestionably an important factor in the reliability of any
7 See, e.g., Cutler, Penrod & Martens, The Reliability of Eyewitness Identification,
11 L. & HuM. BEHAv 233, 234 (1987); Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence,
4 L. & HuM. BEHAV 243, 258 (1980); Wells & Murray, Eyewitness Confidence in G. WEL S
& E. LoFrus, supra note 3, at 155.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 115; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
t See Wells & Murray, supra note 76, at 354.
t2 Id.
1 Id., see also Goldstein, Johnson & Chance, Does Fluency of Face Description Imply
Superior Face Recognition?, 1979 BuLL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 13, 15-18; Howells, A Study
of Ability to Recognize Faces, 33 J. oF ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCH. 124, 124-27 (1938).
" A.D. Yp jRy, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EyEnwrss TESTimONY 138-39 (1979) (quoted
in Jonakait, Reliable Identification: Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v. Brath-
waite?, 52 U. CoLo. L. Rnv 511, 520 (1981)).
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subsequent identification by the eyewitness. 5 It appears, however,
that the factors that courts have applied in determining the eye-
witness' degree of attention may be misleading. For example, many
courts appear to believe that a person in danger will be more
attentive than a person who is not in danger, and thus the endan-
gered person would provide a more reliable identification. 6 The
scientific evidence, however, demonstrates that, to the contrary,
people in stressful situations-such as victims of crimes-are sig-
nificantly less reliable than those who see their subjects in com-
paratively calm surroundings.81 Some courts also apparently believe
that certain people, police officers in particular, are better able to
attend to the details of a person's face and make a reliable iden-
tification.8 However, studies demonstrate that police are no more
reliable than other people in making identifications . 9
4. The Eyewitness's Opportunity to View the Assailant
The eyewitness's opportunity to view the assailant, is another
important factor in evaluating the reliability of the eyewitness's
subsequent identification. Like the degree of attention critenon,
the opportunity criterion is not fully understood or correctly ap-
plied by courts. Although scientific studies demonstrate that people
systematically overestimate the duration of an event, 90 and although
this appears to be especially true when the person estimating the
duration is under stress, 91 courts do not take witnesses' overesti-
mation "biases" into account when evaluating their opportunity
to view assailants. Moreover-as in the case of the degree-of-
" Manson, 432 U.S. at 115; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; Wells & Murray, supra note
79, at 155-70.
8 See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 234-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("One
need only observe another person's face for 10 seconds by the clock To the resisting
woman, the 10 to 15 seconds would seem endless.").
17 See Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face Memory, in G. WELLs & E. LoFrus, supra note
3, at 20.
88 See, e.g., Manson, 432 U.S. at 115 (noting that the identifying witness was "a
trained police officer"); Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Robinson, 782 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d
1349, 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (voice identification), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United
States v. Bothwell, 465 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1972).
19 See Clifford, Police as Eyewitnesses, 36 NEw Socmry 176, 176-77 (April 1976);
Tickner & Poulton, Watching for People and Actions, 18 ERGONOMIcs 35 (1975).
10 Cutler, Penrod & Martens, supra note 79, at 253; Gross, Loss of Innocence:
Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEoAL STUD. 395, 398 (1987).
11 Sarason & Stoops, Test Anxiety and the Passage of Time, 46 J. CONSULTING AND
CuCAL PsYcH. 102 (1978).
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attention criterion-courts have not given specific content to this
criterion, which would guide litigants. Courts have not established
whether there is a mmmum threshold duration that is satifactory
for subsequent reliable identifications, or whether there is a "Slid-
ing scale" of durations, or exactly how one is to work the oppor-
tunity-to-view criterion into the constitutional test.
5. The Time Elapsed Between the Criminal Incident and the
Pretrial Identification Procedure
Witnesses' memories do not decline in a linear fashion over
time. Rather, it appears that the accuracy of most peoples' mem-
ones declines sharply shortly after an event, but then declines very
little over an extended period of time. 92 Evidence further indicates
that just as important as the passage of time is what the eyewitness
experiences during the interval between the criminal incident and
the identification procedure. Activities like viewing mugshots9 or
hearing another person's description of the assailant 94 may influ-
ence the reliability of an identification. Since these points were not
mentioned by the Court m Manson or Biggers, and because so
many courts simply follow those decisions to the letter, the consti-
tutional test that these courts apply may be deficient. 95
6. Additional Relevant Factors
A variety of additional factors may influence the reliability of
identifications, but the Supreme Court did not mention them, and
they have been largely ignored by other courts. For example: it is
established that people are more accurate in identifying people of
their own race than they are in identifying people of different
races; 96 the presence of a weapon makes people less reliable ob-
92 E. LoFrus, supra note 3, at 53; J. SnEsmHmD, H. ELIAs & G. DAVIS, IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE: A PSYCHOLOGiCAL EVALUATION 80-86 (1982); Gross, supra note 90, at 399.
91 Gorenstem & Ellsworth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect Photograph on a Later
Identification by an Eyewitness, 65 J. App. PSYCH. 616 (1980); Davies, Shepherd & Ellis,
Similarity Effects in Face Recognition, 92 AM. J. PSYCH. 507 (1979).
9 Loftus & Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May be Contagious, 4 L. &
Hum. BEHAV. 323 (1980).
95 Notably, the dissent in Manson was aware that memory for faces declines rapidly
immediately after the incident but then holds comparatively stable for a period of time. See
Manson, 432 U.S. at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Courts generally have not sought to
develop the implications of this point.
9See, e.g., Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CoR-
Nma L. REV. 934, 938 and n.18 (1984) (citing authorities).
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servers of faces;97 one study suggests that-contrary to what most
people and courts believe-the more accurate a person's memory
for peripheral details, the less reliable the person's selection in an
identification procedure; 98 and, it is well-established that the ques-
tions witnesses are asked by the police before the witnesses attempt
identification procedures may affect their selection." None of these
points is considered by most courts applying the constitutional test
for reliability
One potential solution to the scientific shortcomings of the
Supreme Court's due process test would be to refine the test to
take into account the various factors noted above. For example,
the test could be revised to excise any reliance on a witness's
certainty about her identification, to elaborate the factor that re-
lates to the time elapsed between incident and procedure, and
generally to take into account all of the refinements and insights
that appear to be scientifically justified. These changes would
improve the reliability test, but would not lead to a satisfactory
outcome. To be scientifically respectable, any constitutional test
adopted by the Supreme Court would necessarily be extremely
lengthy, detailed and cumbersome. The factors that influence the
reliability of an identification are too numerous to be encapsulated
in a single, easily stated and applied standard.
Moreover, the science of eyewitness identification is developing
dramatically It is not a settled field, and a great deal of research
remains to be done. Erecting a constitutional standard upon shift-
ing grounds such as these invites the danger-already realized in
Biggers and Manson and their progeny-that the constitutional test
will not be scientifically valid. This places inferior federal courts
and state courts in the awkward position of being required to apply
a test mandated by the Supreme Court that is scientifically invalid.
A constitutional test lacking an adequate basis in scientific findings
divorces law from accuracy and impedes the law's promotion of
justice. 100 Of course, this is not to suggest that scientific develop-
91 L. TAYLOR, EYEwrrES IDENTIFICATION 32 (1982); Loftus, Loftus & Messo, Some
Facts About Weapons Focus, II L. & Hum. BEHAv. 55 (1987).
- Wells & Leippe, How Do "Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identi-
fication? Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J. AP'. PsYcH. 682
(1981); see also Wells & Murray, supra note 81, at 353.
" See G. WELLs & E. LoF-us, supra note 3, at 129-30.
,o* Cf. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REv 655, 659-68 (1988) (noting importance of empircal
truth to development of constitutional standards); Davis, "There is a Book Out " An
[VOL. 79
PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
ments have no role to play in constitutional adjudication. Obvi-
ously they do, and scientific developments have been instrumental
in the definition and establishment of certain constitutional rights. 10'
The point is simply that given the emergent state of scientific
knowledge about eyewitness identifications, the Supreme Court's
adoption of the five factors test was not a sound application of
scientific principles to constitutional adjudication.
B. The Muddled Legacy of Manson v Brathwaite
Since Manson, the inferior federal courts and state courts have
applied the right to due process extremely narrowly, and their
analyses of the right often have evidenced confusion and conflict
with one another on almost every point. The poor performance of
the lower courts and the state courts in applying the right to due
process demonstrates the inadequacy of the Supreme Court's for-
mulation of the right.
1. The Definition of Suggestiveness
The inferior federal courts and the state courts have been
inconsistent about the elemental question of what circumstances
rendered a pretrial procedure suggestive. For example, in the lineup
situation, some courts have disapproved of lineups in which the
defendant had a distinguishing feature that was not shared by the
other members of the lineup.i °2 Other courts have been more
lement, indicating that some characteristics, but not others, make
a difference in determimng whether-a lineup was suggestive. 103 At
Analysis- of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARv. L. REv 1539 (1987)
(describing questionable decisions arising from courts' practice of taking judicial notice of
a controversial scientific theory); see also O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social
Sciences and the Courts, 64 JuDicATuRE 8 (1980) (noting dangers of judicial reliance on
social science data in formulating constitutional rights).
101 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 148-49 & n.44 (1973).
102 Sei, e.g., United States v. Bice-Bay, 701 F.2d 1086, 1089 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[I~t
was suggestive to show [the witness] only one photograph, that of [defendant]
portraying a woman with dred locks and a head covering."); People v. Owens, 543 N.Y.S.2d
372, 541 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1989) (lineup suggestive where defendant's jacket stood out
-from other jackets in lineup); People v. Tatum, 129 Misc. 2d 196, 204-05, 492 N.Y.S.2d
999, 1003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (lineup suggestive where only defendant had a glass eye);
see cases cited infra at note 122.
,03 See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 868 F.2d 492, 495 (Ist Cir. 1989) (photospread
unobjectionable although defendant was the only person pictured with an earring); Jarrett
v. Headley, 802 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1986) ("It is not required, however, that all of the
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least one court has held that a lineup is not suggestive unless it is
"virtually inevitable" that the witness will select the defendant. 104
As a consequence of having different standards, courts reach dif-
ferent conclusions on almost identical facts. For example, in United
States v Thurston,1 5 the court held that a photo lineup in which
the defendant was the only one of six "which had a beard and
whose hair was braided" was not unduly suggestive. 1 6 By contrast,
in People v Moore,10 7 the court reversed a conviction on the
ground that the defendant was the only one in the lineup with
braided hair.18 Similar confusion exists in courts' analyses of show-
ups. Some courts have held that show-ups are presumptively sug-
gestive, whereas other have held that show-ups are unobjectionable
absent aggravating circumstances.'1 9 There are numerous other ex-
amples of courts reaching contrary conclusions on almost identical
facts.110
photographs in the array be uniform with respect to a given characteristic."); United States
v. Jackson, 509 F.2d 499, 505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (lineup not suggestive although only
defendant had a "bush hairstyle," as the witness had described the assailant as wearing);
State v. Haymon, 639 S.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Mo. App. 1982) (lineup not suggestive even
though defendant was the only person in the lineup with a "scarred face" and disfigured
chin).
114 Caver v. State, 537 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5th Cir. 1976); see also United States v.
Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 956 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding photo identification: "[lI]t cannot be
said that [defendant's] picture would inevitably be selected whether or not he was in fact
the robber, despite the fact that his picture was the only one that resembled the robber's
description.") (citations omitted); Clay v. Vose, 599 F Supp. 1505, 1522 (D. Mass. 1984)
(eyewitness identification admissible unless there is a "very substantial likelihood" of
misidentification), aff'd, 771 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986).
WI 771 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1985).
'o' United States v. Thurston, 771 F.2d 449, 453 (10th Cir. 1985).
533 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
101 People v. Moore, 533 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
9 Compare People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 251, 423 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 1981) (show-
up identifications are presumptively excluded) with Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726, 729
(11th Cir. 1987) ("show-ups are not unnecessarily suggestive unless the police aggravate the
suggestiveness of the confrontation") (citation omitted).
110 Compare United States v. Ricks, 817 F.2d 692, 697 (11th Cir. 1987) (photo spread
not suggestive although defendant was the only person wearing glasses) with Israel v. Odom,
521 F.2d 1370, 1374 n.7 (7th Cir. 1975) (lineup unconstitutional because defendant was the
only person in it wearing glasses); compare Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 444 (4th
Cir. 1986) (identification unobjectionable even though defendant was the only person
wearing a "plaid flannel shirt over another shirt" as the assailant had worn) and Davis v.
United States, 367 A.2d 1254, 1265 (D.C. App. 1976) (lineup evidence admissible even
though defendant was the only person wearing a dashiki, as had the assailant) with People
v. Owens, 543 N.Y.S.2d 372, 541 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1989) (finding lineup impermissibly
suggestive where defendant wore distinctive coat) and People v. Sapp, 469 N.Y.S.2d 803
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (same).
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Courts also have been uncertain about what obligation the
police have to avoid or correct potentially suggestive procedures.
Coleman,"' for example, suggested that as long as the police did
not actively cause a procedure to be suggestive the defendant's
nght to due process was not violated, but some lower courts have
ruled that procedures were suggestive even if the source of the
suggestiveness was not created by the police.1 2 The confusion of
the inferior federal courts and the state courts is directly attribut-
able to the Supreme Court's failure to provide a defimtion of
suggestiveness in pretrial identification procedures and the Court's
wavering treatment of the topic, as exemplified by the sharp con-
trast between Wade"3 and Coleman."4 The absence of a workable
definition of suggestiveness and the lack of a clear statement about
the responsibility of the police to prevent suggestive procedures
from taking place have led at least one court to exasperation:
[There can be an infinite variety of differing situations involved
in the conduct of a particular lineup. The police are not
required to conduct a search for identical twins in age, height,
weight or facial features. If an Eskimo were to be involved in a
burglary, it is not to be expected that the sheriff will seek
to locate or to send to the Arctic for tribesmen who could pass
as brothers." 5
2. Inconsistency in Courts' Evaluations of Reliability
When the inferior federal courts and state courts find that
pretrial procedures are suggestive, and thus embark on the second
step of the Manson test, their analyses are equally problematic.
"' 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
.2 See, e.g., Odom, 521 F.2d at 1374 n.6; Owens, 541 N.E.2d 372, 401 (N.Y. 1989);
Moore, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 603 (iineup suggestive where police did not cover defendants' hair
even though defendant was the only person in the lineup with braided hair and braided
hair had "figured prominently in [the witness'] description of the robber").
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
"' 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
Wright v. State, 174 N.W.2d 646, 652 (1969), quoted in United States ex rel. Cnst
v. Lane, 745 F.2d 476, 479 n.i (7th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d
192, 199 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The due process clause does not require law enforcement officers
to scour about for a selection of photographs so similar in their subject matter and
composition as to make subconscious influences on witnesses an objective impossibility.");
United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1976) ("Police stations are not
theatrical casting offices; a reasonable effort to harmonize the lineup is normally all that is
required."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
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Although the five factors are not scientifically sound," 6 and the
Supreme Court stated that the five factors it identified in Biggers
were not the only factors that a court could consider in making its
reliability determination, most courts have applied the five factors
exclusively 117 And, although the Supreme Court stated expressly
that the five reliability factors are to be "weighed [against] the
corrupting effect of the suggestive identification" procedure," 8 most
courts have not done so. Instead, if the courts determine that the
pretrial identification procedure is suggestive, they simply move to
the five-factor test and ignore the corrupting effects of the pretrial
procedure." 9 The lower courts' failure to include the suggestive
procedure in their reliability analysis is a serious omission because,
as the Supreme Court has recogmzed and scientific evidence dem-
onstrates, a suggestive procedure may have a considerable effect
on the reliability of any subsequent identification. 20
A result of the confusion has been that courts almost invariably
find that identifications are admssible regardless of the procedures
or circumstances.' 2' Courts are reluctant to exclude eyewitness ev-
idence on due process grounds. Repeatedly, confronted by sugges-
tive identification procedures, courts conclude that eyewitness
evidence cannot be excluded on due process grounds unless the
pretrial procedure caused a "very substantial likelihood of irrepa-
rable misidentification."' 22 The courts almost invariably find that
116 See supra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
1,7 See, e.g., Alexander, 868 F.2d at 492-96; McFadden v. Cabana, 851 F.2d 784, 790
(5th Cir. 1988); Cooley v. Lockhart, 839 F.2d 431-32 (8th Cir. 1988); Thigpen v. Cory, 804
F.2d 893, 895-97 (6th Cir. 1986); Dickerson, 692 F.2d at 244-47; Solomon, 645 F.2d at
1185-86.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
119 See, e.g., McFadden, 851 F.2d at 790; United States v. Wilson, 787 F.2d 375, 385-
86 (8th Cir. 1986); Minetos v. Scully, 625 F Supp. 815, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 229 (once a witness has made a choice, "he is not likely to
go back on his word later on. "); Gorenstein & Ellsworth, supra note 93 at 621-22.
121 See, e.g., Cooley, 839 F.2d at 431-32; Johnston v. Makowski, 823 F.2d 387, 391
(10th Cir. 1987); United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1155-61 (7th Cir.
1987); Cotton v. Armontrout, 784 F.2d 320, 321-23 (8th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Lockhart,
736 F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any
Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72
MICH. L. Rav 717, 780 (1974) ("[T]he Supreme Court should have anticipated that courts
generally would use every conceivable method to avoid finding due process violations except
in the most outrageous situations."); Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs and Criminals: Utilitarian
Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 328 n.43 (1984) ("The lower
courts have applied the Stovall-Manson rule in a manner that routinely permits identifica-
tions secured by all but the most outrageous procedures.").
', See, e.g., State v. Tresize, 623 P.2d 1, 4 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Hagen, 275 N.W.2d
49, 50 (Minn. 1979); In re L.W., 390 A.2d 435, 437 (D.C. App. 1978).
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this has not occurred. As one commentator stated, the lower courts
interpret the right to due process "in a manner that routinely
permits identifications secured by all but the most outrageous
procedures."'2 A few examples will demonstrate the courts' atti-
tudes towards the right to due process m connection with pretrial
identification procedures. 2
In MeGuff v Alabama,'2 the court upheld the admission of
in-court identifications against a due process challenge where the
defendant (a) was displayed to the eyewitness the day after the
crime as he sat alone in a police car in which he was being driven
"from place to place to have various witnesses identify him," and
(b) "was viewed in his cell by a number of persons for the sole
purpose of making identification." 126 Although the court con-
demned the procedure, it found that the identifications were prob-
ably reliable because the defendant's "rude and unprovoked conduct
assured that he would have the [witness'] undivided attention,"
and the witnesses "adamantly testified as to the certainty of their
identification.' ' 2 7
In Cotton v Armontrout,lu in-court identifications by three
eyewitnesses were admitted even though (a) one of the witnesses
could'not select the defendant's photograph from an array of
photos that he was shown immediately after the criminal incident,
(b) a month later, he selected the defendant's photo from an array
in which the defendant was the only person shown wearing.jail
clothing, but only after being told by the police that the suspect's
picture was in the array, and (c) the other two eyewitnesses iden-
tified the defendant two weeks after the criminal incident at a
show-up that the court found was unnecessary because the police
could and should have used a lineup.
In United States v Hadley,129 a bank robbery suspect was
shown, in handcuffs and surrounded by police, to four witnesses
simultaneously; the witnesses had been told before viewing the
suspect that the robber had been caught, but the court found that
the identifications were sufficiently reliable to be admissible.
"2 Seidman, supra note 121, at 328 n.3.
12, See also Gross, supra note 3, at 403-04 n.41 (listing some startling examples).
-- 566 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1978).
126 McGuff v. Alabama, 566 F.2d 939, 940 (5th Cir. 1978).
12, Id. at 941.
2 784 F.2d 320 (8th Cir. 1986).
- 671 F.2d 1112 (8th-Cir. 1982).
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In Wilkins v Sumner,130 an in-court identification did not
violate due process even though the witness had viewed a pretrial
display of four photos in which the defendant's photo clearly stood
out and even though the police had told the witness before he
viewed the photos that they believed they had the suspect.
An in-court identification was permitted m Bankston v State131
even though the witness had identified the defendant at a pretrial
display of photographs in which the defendant was the only person
in the photographic display with a mustache, and the witness had
told the police previously that the assailant had a mustache.
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons that courts have treated the
right to due process in such a cavalier fashion is their belief that
a jury is capable of evaluating the identification evidence. Not-
withstanding the observation by the Supreme Court in United
States v Wade32 and the numerous psychological studies to the
contrary, courts consistently rule that the eyewitness testimony is
"well-within the ordinary experience of a jury ,,13
3. Courts' Improper Considerations of Extraneous Factors
Relating to Reliability
Lower federal courts and state courts also have tended to
confuse their assessments of the probable guilt of the defendant
with their evaluations of his right to due process. In particular,
courts' determinations of whether an eyewitness identification is
reliable have been influenced by whether other evidence of the
defendants' guilt exists. The right has thus become intertwined with
the court's judgment of the defendant's guilt or innocence. The
case of Mullen v Blackburn34 Is typical: 35
11 475 F Supp. 495 (E.D. Va. 1979).
"1 391 So. 2d 1005, 1007-09 (Miss. 1980).
"3 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
" Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479, 1486 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Harker v.
Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[S]uch evidence is for the jury to weigh
for evidence with some element of untrustworthmess is customary grind for the jury mill.")
(citation omitted); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 1985) ("ilt could
be argued to the trier of fact that [the identification] has little independent probative
value."); People v. Castellano, 145 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. App. 1978) (permitting photo
identification, notwithstanding that defendant was the only person pictured with a birth-
mark, because the photos could be shown to the jury, which could deterinne the weight to
give the identification).
808 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1987).
" See also United States v. Lau, 828 F.2d 871, 875 (lst Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1005 (1988); United States v. DiTomasso, 817 F.2d 201, 214 n.17 (2d Cir. 1987);
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[Defendant's] first claim is that the eyewitness identifications
made by three eyewitnesses at trial should have been excluded
from evidence. He concedes, however, that he was apprehended
while committing the robbery and was, in fact, guilty as charged.
Thus, he effectively concedes that the identifications were relia-
ble. 136
Tls passage demonstrates that, to the Mullen court, the de-
fendant's right to due process was extinguished once it became
clear that he "was, in fact, guilty as charged."'1 37 In effect, the
Court reasoned as follows: (1) The defendant is probably guilty,
and therefore, (2) the identification is probably reliable, and con-
sequently (3) its admission into evidence is not a violation of due
process. This reasomng puts the cart before the horse: one should
derive a defendant's guilt from an identification, not the other way
around. One can scarcely imagine a court speaking the same way
about a defendant's fourth amendment right to be free from illegal
searches and seizures or his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. 13  The reasomng is contrary to the principle that all
defendants have equal constitutional rights, regardless of whether
they are ultimately found guilty by the trier of fact. 139
United States v. Bell, 812 F.2d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ivory, 563 F.2d
887, 889 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The circumstances surrounding the confrontation make the
likelihood of misidentification extremely slight. [The defendant] was taken into custody near
the scene of the robbery and police officers testified that he was in continuous custody until
the time of the confrontation. The district court found that these facts provided a separate
basis for identifying [the defendant] as the perpetrator We find no error in the
admission of the identification testimony. "); United States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Zelker,
477 F.2d 797, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Moreover, in determining whether or not the
suggestive photographic identification procedure resulted in misidentification, we may prop-
erly consider the other factors which were before the jury and were properly admissible
which tend to establish that there was not substantial likelihood of misidentification.")
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); Bennett v. State, 530 S.W.2d 511,
515 (Tenn. 1975) (upholding identification procedure under "totality of the circumstances,"
which included "the fact that seven days after the commission of the offense here involved,
the defendant was apprehended, late at night, on the same night of the week, at the same
motel, attempting to enter an adjoimng room while armed with a pistol of the same calibre
used to inflict the wound on the victim's companion").
Im Mullen, 808 F.2d at 1145 (5th Cir. 1987).
'7 Id.
I" See Idaho v. Wright, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990) (in determining whether
an out-of-court statement is sufficiently reliable for Confrontation Clause purposes to be
admitted, a court should consider only the circumstances that surround the making of that
statement and not other corroborative evidence).
11 Justice Marshall focused on precisely this problem in his dissent in Manson v.
Brathwaite, in which he argued that the Court's reliability analysis "suggests a reinterpre-
tation of the concept of due process of law in crminal cases. By relying on the probable
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It is important to understand the nature of this problem, which
is practical rather than logical. A court can know that an identi-
fication is reliable from evidence other than evidence about the
crime itself by focusing exclusively on the circumstances surround-
ing the identification, and not on any extraneous factors as the
Mullen court did.14° However, in practice, courts often look beyond
the circumstances surrounding the identification itself; when they
do, with their evaluation of his probable guilt or innocence, they
are improperly compromising the defendant's constitutional right
to due process.
One can hardly blame the lower courts for. being confused. As
noted above, the Supreme Court itself confused probable guilt and
constitutional analysis when it set forth the third Neil v Biggers
factor: "[IThe accuracy of the witness' prior description of the
criminal. "141 It is telling that few courts have ever noted this
obvious error by the Supreme Court.
4. The Redundancy of the Right to Due Process and the Law
of Evidence
Both the right to due process and the rules of evidence provide
for the exclusion of unreliable evidence. 142 This identity of purpose
has led at least one court to treat a defendant's claim arising under
the due process clause as presenting merely an evidentiary prob-
lem.' 43 The failure to distinguish between constitutional analysis
and evidentiary analysis may be of considerable importance to the
criminal defendant, for the harmless error standard for constitu-
tional errors is more stringent-that is, more favorable to the
defendant-than the harmless error standard for nonconstitutional
accuracy of a challenged identification, instead of the necessity for its use, the Court seems
to be ascertaining whether the defendant was probably guilty." Manson, 432 U.S. at 128
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
"40 Professor Seidman is therefore wrong when he criticizes Manson v. Brathwaite,
arguing that "[a] court can know that the identification is reliable only from evidence about
the crime." Seidman, supra note 121, at 328 n.42. A court may be able to determine that
an identification is reliable from factors surrounding the identification process, not just the
crane itself.
1-1 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 (emphasis added); see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying
text (discussing circularity problems).
42 See FED. R. EvuD. 403.
141 See State v. Lutz, 398 A.2d 115, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (applying
Neil v. Biggers test and evidentiary analysis simultaneously).
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errors.' 4 By analyzing a due process error as a nonconstitutional
evidentiary error, a court may protect its judgment from the com-
paratively harsh standard of harmless error review for constitu-
tional errors.
Although United States v Dowling'45 did not deal with eyewit-
ness testimony, it demonstrates this problem. In Dowling, the
defendant alleged that the admission into evidence of testimony
about a prior crime for which the defendant had been acquitted
was so prejudicial that it violated is right to due process.'" The
circuit court held that the admission of the testimony was indeed
error, but applied the lesser harmless error standard applicable to
nonconstitutional errors, and upheld the conviction. 47 The Su-
preme Court affirmed. While it recognized the possibility of prej-
udice from the introduction of evidence of the prior crime, the
Court found no constitutional error because "it is acceptable to
deal with the potential for [undue prejudice] through nonconsti-
tutional sources like the Federal Rules of Evidence," rather than
through constitutional interpretation.'" In other words, the defen-
dant's constitutional claim was transmuted into a nonconstitutional
evidentiary issue, and then disposed of through the relatively weak
nonconstitutional harmless error rule.
The lesson is not that Dowling's claim, or the claim of a
defendant confronted by unreliable evidence, should necessarily be
cogmzable under the due process clause rather than the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Rather, the lesson is that, unless courts clearly
distinguish whether they are engaged in constitutional analysis or
evidentiary analysis, the overlap between constitutional and eviden-
tiary standards will lead to confusion and, ultimately, to the weak-
emng of the constitutional right. 149
I" See United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd on other
grounds, U.S., 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990); McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916,
925 n.14 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing authorities); United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1204
(5th Cir. 1984).
855 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).
,'Id. The defendant also argued that the testimony about the prior crime violated the
double jeopardy clause, but the Supreme Court rejected this argument. See Dowling, U.S.
at, 110 S. Ct. at 671-74.
14 Dowling, 855 F.2d at 122-24.
'Dowling, -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. at 674-75 ("Dowling contends that the use
of this type of evidence creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury will convict
the defendant on the basis of inferences drawn from the acquitted conduct; we believe that
the trial court's authority to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence -[i.e., FED. R. Evm.
403] adequately addresses this possibility.").
149 Cf. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35
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C. Due Process and Procedural Fairness
Biggers and Manson established that the fairness of pretrial
identification procedures was irrelevant to the right to due process,
and that the only relevant question for constitutional analysis of
pretrial identification procedures concerned the reliability of the
evidence that resulted from those procedures.5 " The focus on re-
liability rather than fairness differed from the focus that the Court
had given the due process clause in applying it to other aspects of
criminal procedure. The difference is troubling because the Court
had consistently assigned to the due process clause in other circum-
stances the role of serving as a guarantor of standards of fairness
and decency Such a role is called for as well in pretrial identifi-
cation procedures.
Before Stovall v Denno, the Supreme Court had established
that due process required crimunal trials and pretrial procedures to
adhere to societal standards of fairness and decency, even though
adherence to these standards might sacrifice the accuracy of the
trial in some cases. Thus, for example, the Court held that the due
process clause proscribes criminal procedures that violate "funda-
mental conceptions of justice"1 51 or "offend the community's sense
of fair play and decency ' 152 even if those procedures led to reliable
evidence.153 The Court also had established that "the community's
sense of fair play and decency" is not identical to the rights
enumerated in the Constitution, but exists independent of those
rights. Accordingly, the Court had held that some practices are
mandated or proscribed by due process even in the absence of
another, more specific, constitutional provision.' 54 And, of course,
the Court has historically insisted that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment does not merely incorporate each of the
UCLA L. Rv. 557, 576-80 (1988) (criticizing the accuracy-based focus of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the confrontation clause on the grounds that it "causes the
constitutional provision's subordination to the evidence law").
110 See supra Aotes 56-73 and accompanying text.
'"' United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam)).
"1 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952), overruled in Forte v. State, 778
S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)
(recognizing "fundamental fairness" standard in evaluating law enforcement conduct).
"I See Rochm, 342 U.S. at 165.
,' See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (including standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt "among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment');
see supra notes 151-52 (citing cases).
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provisions of the Bill of Rights but instead embodies another,
independent standard that is not cotermnous with the Bill of
Rights. 155
"The community's sense of fair play and decency" is, admit-
tedly, difficult to define, and depends for its content more on
intuition than logic. A strong argument exists, however, that un-
necessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures violate the
community's sense of fair play and decency Unnecessarily sugges-
tive pretrial identification procedures differ from most other im-
proper law enforcement activities because they do not further any
valid law enforcement interest. Although a violation of a suspect's
fourth or fifth amendment rights-for example, a warrantless search
or an interrogation without a lawyer present-is plainly wrong, it
might at least further the valid law enforcement objective of col-
lecting relevant evidence. By contrast, an unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure simply creates unreliable evidence where
reliable evidence could have been gathered.' 56 It is not a case where
good ends justify bad means-the end result of an unnecessarily
suggestive procedure is worthless precisely because of the means
used.
Unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures thus gratui-
tously injure the defendant. Such gratuitous injury to the defendant
is contrary to any conceivable notion of fairness in our criminal
system. As one commentator has said, "Surely a system historically
dedicated to protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction
cannot tolerate such gratuitous nsks.''5
The sting of gratuitous harm to the defendant is especially
sharp in the context of pretrial identification procedures, because
such procedures place the state in a delicate role in relation to the
defendant. In most situations the state simply collects preexisting
evidence about a crime; through pretrial identifications the state
creates a piece of evidence that would not otherwise exist. The
creation of evidence, rather than its collection, should impose a
special obligation on the state to behave correctly, because the
creation of evidence presents heightened opportunity for wrong-
doing and unfairness by the state and to the detriment of the
1,1 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
' See Seidman, supra note 121, at 327.
" Grano, supra note 121, at 782.
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defendant.158 In this context, the threat of gratuitous injury to the
defendant is intolerable.
The unfairness of unnecessarily suggestive identification pro-
cedures (rather than the reliability of evidence derived from such
procedures) lay at the heart of Stovall, in which the Court recog-
nized that the show-up procedure at issue in the case was suggestive
but held that because the suggestive procedure was unavoidable
there was no due process violation. 59 The Court's holding makes
sense only if the issue at stake is fairness, not accuracy Moreover,
the only case cited by Stovall in its analysis of the due process
issue was Palmer v Peyton,16 which had relied upon the line of
cases establishing that the due process clause did not simply pro-
mote accuracy, but also protected values of fairness and decency 16,
Even Neil v Biggers acknowledged that unnecessarily suggestive
procedures are more problematic than, and different from, neces-
sarily suggestive ones. The Court stated, "Suggestive confronta-
tions are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of
misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned
for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification
is gratuitous."62
The law pertaimng to the destruction of evidence further dem-
onstrates the relevance of principles of fairness in the context of
identification procedures. Conducting an unnecessarily suggestive
pretrial identification procedure is analogous to creating one piece
of evidence, the identification that results from the procedure, and
destroying another piece of evidence, the identification, or failure
of identification, that would have resulted from a correctly con-
ducted process. Indeed, an unnecessarily suggestive procedure
threatens to compromise all of the subsequent identification testi-
mony by the witness who experienced the procedure, because all
such later testimony might be tainted. Given the powerful anchor-
ing effects of the suggestive procedure on any subsequent identi-
sI There may be an analogy between pretrial identification procedures and entrapment.
In each case, the state takes an active role in creating evidence, and in the case of
entrapment, creating a crime. Notably, courts have repeatedly expressed concerns about
defendants' rights to fundamental fairness in the entrapment context. See Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489 (1976) (plurality opinion); United States v. Luttrell, 889
F.2d 806, 811-14 (9th Cir. 1989).
" See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
"' 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966) cited in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
161 Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1966).
' Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added). Of course, the Court did not require
any different test for unnecessarily and necessarily suggestive procedures.
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fication, 63 as a practical matter a non-suggestive procedure cannot
be conducted after a suggestive one. Even though a court may find
that the subsequent testimony has an "independent basis" in the
criminal incident itself, given the complexity of the memory process
and courts' general ignorance about that process, one can hardly
be confident of the independence of the subsequent testimony.
The Supreme Court has established that .the bad faith destruc-
tion of evidence by the state may violate a defendant's right to
due process. 16 The meaning of "bad faith" in this context is
unclear, 65 but its inclusion may indicate that, insofar as the state's
handling of evidence is concerned, the Court is especially concerned
with the integrity of the crimnal process, not just with its accuracy
An unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedure, be-
cause it gratuitously injures a defendant, may be said to demon-
strate bad faith on the part of the police. The destruction of
evidence cases provide an analogy that the courts could use to find
an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedure a vio-
lation of due process.
In Manson v Brathwaite, the Court gave three reasons for its
exclusive focus on reliability rather than fairness. The first reason
was that a suggestive identification procedure did not "itself in-
trude upon a constitutionally protected interest." ' 6 Although the
Court did notidentify "constitutionally protected interest[s]," it
163 See Id.
,64 See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 336-37 (1988);
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). The other factors are whether the
defendant had other means of exoneration, and whether the evidence likely would have
been exculpatory. Id. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*, 109 S. Ct. at 336-37; see also J.
GORELICK, S. MARzEN & L. SoLtrm, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE §§ 6.4 - 6.8 (1989) [here-
inafter DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE] (discussing constitutional limits on evidence destruction).
16 Compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-59, 109 S. Ct. at 336 (Presence or absence
of bad faith "must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of
the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.") with id. at 56 n.*, 109 S. Ct. at 342
(Blackmun, J., dissenting):
What constitutes bad faith for these purposes? Does a defendant have to show
actual malice, or would recklessness, or the deliberate failure to establish
standards for maintaining and preserving evidence, be sufficient? Does 'good
faith police work' require a certain minfmum of diligence, or will a lazy
officer, who does not walk the few extra steps to the evidence refrigerator [to
preserve the evidence], be considered to be acting in good faith?
See also J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SoLum, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (Wiley 1988 &
Supp.) at Supplement § 6.8 at 20-21 (discussing Youngblood's bad faith standard).
161 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 n.13; see also United States ex. rel Kirby v. Sturges, 510
F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding "show up" not inherently a violation of the
Constitution), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
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contrasted identification procedures with warrantless searches, and
intimated that such searches might invade a defendant's "consti-
tutionally protected interest" in privacy 167 By making this com-
parison, the Court implied that "constitutionally protected
interest[s]" meant those interests protected by specific provisions
of the Bill of Rights, and thus appeared to be saying that fairness
was a constitutional value only insofar as some specific provision
of the Bill of Rights was implicated. This reasomng implies that
the only rights that a defendant has are the rights specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and allows no additional or
independent significance to the due process clause. This is plainly
not the law.'6
The second reason given by the Court for its focus on reliability
was its belief that the right to due process in connection with
pretrial identification procedures was of less importance than other
constitutional rights, like the right to counsel, that "go to the very
heart-the 'integrity'-of the adversary process.' ' 69 The Court stated
that the right to due process in connection with pretrial identifi-
cation procedures merely "protects an evidentiary interest." 170 But
the Court's bifurcation of constitutional rights between those that
go to the heart of the adversarial process and those that do not is
misguided. It is hard to imagine any reason for believing that the
right to be free of unnecessarily suggestive procedures is not "in-
tegral" to our criminal justice system. Protecting innocent defen-
dants from wrongful conviction is the centerpiece of that system,
and that value is unjustifiably threatened by unnecessarily sugges-
tive identification procedures.
Finally, Manson cited with approval17 ' the case of United States
ex rel. Kirby v Sturges,172 which stated that the right to due process
in connection with pretrial identification procedures was of lesser
value than certain other of the criminal defendants' constitutional
rights because "if a constitutional violation results from a show-
up, it occurs in the courtroom, not in the police station.' '1 73 This
language has been repeated by several inferior federal courts, 74
167 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 n.13.
I" See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
6 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113-14 n.14; see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
170 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 (emphasis in original).
7 Id. at 113 n.13.
-7 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
" United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1515 (1st Cir. 1989).
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and it appears that the Manson Court also focused on this lan-
guage. Upon inspection, however, the "reasomn" of Kirby v
Sturges falters.
All that Kirby v Sturges appears to say is that an unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedure violates a defendant's right to
due process only if and when the identification derived from that
procedure is admitted into evidence; if the state never sought to
have the identification admitted into evidence, then a defendant
could not claim that his right to due process had been violated.
This is true, of course, but it does not make the right to due
process less important than or different from other constitutional
rights of a crimnal defendant, and it does not justify the Court's
exclusive focus on reliability as the sole value underlying the right
to due process. The fifth amendment right against self-incrinuna-
tion, for example, protects a defendant from having certain state-
ments used as substantive evidence against him; if the state does
not seek to use those statements against the defendant then the
defendant cannot assert that his fifth amendment rights have been
violated. 75 However, it is absolutely beyond dispute that there are
values other than reliability underlying the right against self-incrim-
ination. Similarly, a defendant's sixth amendment right not to be
interrogated in certain circumstances without counsel protects against
having statements made during such interrogations entered into
evidence against the defendant, but if the state does not seek to
have those statements entered into evidence, then the defendant's
sixth amendment rights have not been violated. 76 Once again, the
Supreme Court has never suggested that reliability is the only value
underlying the sixth amendment.177
D. The Right to Due Process and the Right to Confrontation
The development of the right to due process was not unique.
At approximately the same time that the right to due process was
7 Indeed, statements that could not be admitted into evidence on account of the
defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incnrmination can be used to impeach the
defendant. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
276 As with the defendant's fifth amendment rights against self incrimination, state-
ments that could not be introduced into evidence against the defendant without violating
her sixth amendment right to counsel may be used to impeach her. See Michigan v. Harvey,
- U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1178 (1990).
' On the distinction between unconstitutionally obtained evidence and unconstitution-
ally used evidence, see generally Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evi-
dence, 87 MIcH. L. R . 907 (1989).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
being transformed from Stovall to Brathwaite, the sixth amendment
right to confrontation1 78 was undergoing similar changes. It is
instructive to compare the metamorphoses of these two rights.
Until the late 1960's, the Supreme Court had little opportunity
to interpret the confrontation clause, 179 and in the first few cases
that the Court decided in the 1960s and early 1970's, the Court
did not clearly articulate a theory of the confrontation clause. 180
Eventually, the Court developed a theory of the right to confron-
tation, and it looked very much like the Court's theory of the right
to due process:
Just as the Court determined that the "linchpin" of the right to
due process was reliability,' 8' it also determined that the "mis-
sion" of the confrontation clause was to promote reliability in
criminal trials; 182
just as the Court countenanced the weakening of the right to
due process on the ground that factors at trial-including the
defendant's opportunity for cross-examination, and the supposed
ability of the jury to discern trustworthy from untrustworthy
testimony 83-would adequately protect the defendant, it also per-
mitted the erosion of the right to confrontation on the ground
that it was unnecessary given other factors, most importantly,
"indicia of reliability"' 84 surrounding the evidence in question
and the opportunity to cross-examine the witness;" 5 and,
just as the Court disregarded the distinction between the right
to due process and Federal Rule of Evidence 403,186 so did it
gradually dimimsh the distinction between the right to confron-
tation and the rules of hearsay, eventually holding that the right
to confrontation was satisfied so long as the evidence in question
"falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."' 87
'78 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
'9 Until Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the leading Supreme Court case on
the confrontation clause was Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
1w See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970);
Pointer, 380 U.S. 400.
' Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. 74; see
also, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 737 (1987); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
"' See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
"' See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-22 (1985) (per curiam).
IM See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
"I Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
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In short, several of the salient features that have been identified
in analyzing the right to due process were also present in the
development of the right to confrontation.
The sunilarity between the developments of these two rights
may alert us to similar evolution in other constitutional rights in
the future. More important for present purposes is Coy v Iowa,'88
virtually the only modern case in which the Supreme Court has
upheld a defendant's assertion that his right to due process had
been violated. The Court departed from its prior decisions' exclu-
sive focus on reliability, and based the right to confrontation on
"something deep m human nature that regards face-to-face con-
frontation between the accused and the accuser as 'essential to a
fair trial in a criminal prosecution.' ' 18 9 This suggests that any
revival of the right to due process likewise would be grounded
upon a value other than reliability
III. A PROPOSED REFORMULATION OF THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS IN CONNECTION WITH PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES
The foregoing analysis of the current formulation of the right
to due process in connection with pretrial identification procedures
demonstrates that the right needs to be rethought. This Part sets
forth an outline of a new formulation of the right to due process.
The proposed formulation has two parts. The first part focuses on
the propriety of police procedures, rather than on the reliability of
the evidence derived from them. It provides that testimony derived
from unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedures is madnussible
per se, without regard to reliability, because such procedures violate
the defendant's right to procedural fairness. The second part of
the proposed right derives from the defendant's right to restrict
the evidence used against him to evidence that is capable of being
rationally evaluated by the jury; the second part provides that
testimony that is not excluded by the first part of the proposed
right may be admitted so long as it meets some rmnmum standards
of probativeness. Additionally, the second part provides that the
'487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
" Id. at 1017 (quoting Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404). Elsewhere in its opimon, the Court
relied upon sources as diverse as the Bible, Shakespeare, and President Eisenhower m
support of its analysis of the nght to confrontation. Id. at 1015-16. The very diversity of
sources demonstrates .that the Court believed there was some value underlying the right to
confrontation other than the reliability of the criminal trial.
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defendant has the right to expert testimony about this evidence.
These parts are discussed in Sections III.B. and III.C., respectively
Part III.A. deals with a preliminary matter-a definition of sug-
gestiveness in pretrial identification procedures.
A. A Proposed Definition of Suggestiveness in Pretrial
Identification Procedures
All courts agree that pretrial identification procedures should
not be suggestive, but they have not always agreed on what makes
a pretrial identification procedure suggestive. As demonstrated
above, 19° courts have differed on whether certain features of pretrial
procedures-for example, features relating to clothing, hair, tattoos
and race-make such procedures suggestive. At the root of the
courts' confusion is their assumption that procedures are suggestive
if one person is "distinctive," or stands out from others. 191 Such
an account of suggestiveness is plainly inadequate because it leads
to a slippery-slope definitional problem: people are recognizable
because they are distinctive. Unless a procedure contains only
identical twins (triplets, quadruplets, etc.), it cannot avoid being
"distinctive" to one degree or another. Similarly, to mcant that
members of a lineup must be "similar in appearance"' 192 is unhelp-
ful; the question inevitably posed is "how similar must they be?"
To avoid this flaw, the following definition of suggestiveness
in pretrial identification procedures should be considered: a pretrial
identification is suggestive if and only if the witness is in some way
apprised of which person in the pretrial identification procedure
the police believe to be the perpetrator. If the witness is "tipped
off" m this way, then the witness's selection of a person from the
190 See supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 868 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 507 (1989) (photo lineup not suggestive even though defendant was the
only person with an earring); Judd v. Voss, 813 F.2d 494, 498 (1st Cir. 1987) (photo array
roughly representative of defendant's age and appearance); O'Brien v. Wainwright, 738
F.2d 1139, 1141 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1li1 (1985) (photo array was
suggestive where defendant's picture "stuck out like a 'sore thumb'); Blanco v. Dugger,
691 F Supp. 308, 312 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (lineup was not impernussibly suggestive because
defendant was not "substantially distinguishable from the others"); People v. Anthony,
109 Misc.2d 433, 435, 440 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (1980) (appearance of defendant and lineup
stand-ins must be "reasonably sunilar"); cf. United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 755
(9th Cir. 1978) ("lilt would be unduly burdensome to require police officials to find five
or six very similar individuals for a lineup.").
"9 See, e.g., United States v. Love, 746 F.2d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Further, all
of the photographs were reasonably similar in appearance to Love.").
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pretrial identification procedure would be the result not simply of
the process of recognition, but of the witness's inference about the
police's behavior. In other words, the witness may think not only
that, "I believe that X is the assailant because I recognize him,"
which is a perfectly acceptable chain of thinking, but might also
think, "I believe that X is the assailant because I recognize him
and the police think that he is the assailant," which is plainly an
improper method of identification for the witness to employ
There is precedential support for the proposed definition. In
Foster v California, the Supreme Court held that the identification
procedure employed was suggestive: "The suggestive elements in
this identification procedure made it all but inevitable that [the
witness] would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact
'the man.' In effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness 'This
is the man.""1 93 Some lower courts also have noted that a lineup
may be suggestive if only one person in it fits the witness's descrip-
tion of the assailant. 194 The courts have not articulated the under-
lying reasoning for their positions, but it is clear enough: if only
one person in the lineup fits the witness's description of the as-
sailant, then the witness viewing the lineup may infer that the
police believe the person to be the assailant. Moreover, some courts
have held that where an identification by a witness occurred in
circumstances that the police did not create-for example, if the
witness saw the suspect on the courtroom steps, or going into the
police station-there is no issue of suggestiveness. 195 This accords
,93 Foster v. Califorma, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (citation omitted) (some emphasis
added); see also Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 407 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Whatever may be said of lineups, showing a suspect singly to a victim is pregnant with
prejudice. The message is clear: the police suspect this man.") (emphasis in original).
,94 See, e.g., Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (only defendant.
wore leather jacket); United States v. Sanders, 479 F.2d 1193, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (only
defendant had goatee); People v. Owens, 74 N.Y.2d 677, 678, 543 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (N.Y.
1989) (Defendant "was the only person wearing the distinctive clothing-a tan vest and a
blue snorkel jacket-which fit the description of the clothing allegedly worn by the perpe-
trator of the crime. In these circumstances, the lineup was unduly suggestive. "); People
v. Moore, 143 A.D.2d 1056, 533 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (lineup suggestive
where police did not cover defendants' hair even though defendant was the only person in
the lineup with braided hair and braided hair had "figured prominently in [the witness']
description of the-robber.").
195 See, e.g., Kimble v. State, 539 P.2d 73, 77 (Alaska 1975) (holding that there is no
due process violation when an accidental pretrial confrontation is not prearranged by the
State); Hill v. United States, 367 A.2d 110, 115 (D.C. 1976) (holding that suppression of
identification testimony on grounds of suggestiveness is proper only as a tool to curtail
improper police procedure); State v. Greathouse, 694 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
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with the proposed definition of suggestiveness: if there was no
police involvement in the identification, then the police could not
have prejudiced the situation or tipped the witness.
The proposed definition makes intuitive sense. Consider a lineup
in which only. one of the participants, the suspect, has green eyes.
The suspect is "distinctive" because he stands out from the others
by virtue of his eye color The lineup may not be suggestive,
however; in the simplest case, if the witness had not seen the
assailant's eyes, then the suspect's eye color would not be impor-
tant. By contrast, if the witness had seen the assailant's eyes, and
if the assailant had green eyes, then the lineup might be suggestive
depending upon whether the witness viewing the lineup had told
the police that the assailant had green eyes. If she had not told
the police, then the lineup would not be suggestive; the witness
might see the assailant's green eyes, and might even select the
suspect because of his eye color, but that is simply part of the
process of recognition: a person is recognized because of his fea-
tures. If, however, the witness did tell the police that the assailant
had green eyes, then the lineup would be suggestive: not only
would that witness recognize the lineup participant because of his
green eyes, but the witness also might infer-perhaps erroneously-
that the suspect was the assailant. The witness might think, "I told
the police that the assailant had green eyes, and since only one
person here has green eyes, the police must believe this person is
the assailant, and that reinforces my belief that this person is the
assailant." It is this chain of inference, in which the witness tries
to divine who the police suspect, that renders the pretrial procedure
suggestive.
The focus on avoiding police influence also accords with sci-
entific evidence. There is a well-documented tendency, called the
"Rosenthal effect," for witnesses to identify people in pretrial
lineups simply because they believe that the assailant must be in
the lineup or else the police would not conduct it.196 Tipping would
exacerbate the Rosenthal effect, because witnesses who are already
inclined to identify someone in the lineup would be especially
(stating that no due process issue was raised by accidental confrontation because it was not
compelled by the police); People v. Graham, 67 A.D.2d 172, 415 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979) (same). This argument was rejected in United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d
1506, 1515-16 n.10 (ist Cir. 1989).
' Jonakait, Reliable Identification: Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v.
Brathwaite, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv 511, 525 (1981); A. YAim-y, supra note 3, at 154-56.
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susceptible to a tip from the police about which one of the lineup
participants the police suspect, is the assailant. 197
The proposed definition of suggestiveness is a better guide in
the difficult situations commonly found in the pretrial identifica-
tion context than is the "suggestiveness-as-distinctiveness" stan-
dard. Rather than forcing the police, attorneys, and courts to ask
themselves in each situation, "was the defendant unduly 'distmc-
tive' in the pretrial identification procedure?"-a question that is
impossible to answer coherently-the proposed standard asks the
more concrete question, "did the witness have reason to believe
when she viewed the pretrial identification procedure, that the
police suspected the defendant?" Putting the question this way
yields clear answers in many situations. For example, it would
condemn the practice of showing a witness multiple sets of photos
or lineups in which only one person, the defendant, is shown in
each set. Although the Supreme Court ruled this practice uncon-
stitutional in Foster v California, it continues to be used, and
courts regularly hold that it is not suggestive. 198 The proposed
standard shows that the practice of showing one person repeatedly
to a witness is suggestive, because the witness will almost inevitably
think, "the police are telling me that 'this is the person,"' and
such thinking is the very essence of suggestiveness.
The proposed definition also suggests an answer to the question
of whether the police have an affirmative duty to avoid suggestive
influences in the pretrial identification procedures or simply not to
create such influences. The analysis suggests that the police have
an obligation to avoid such influences. Consider the facts of Cole-
man, in which the defendant wore a hat similar to a hat that the
witness had described the assailant as having worn. Under the
proposed analysis, this clearly would be suggestive: the witness may
have thought to himself, "because I described that hat to the police
and only one person in the lineup has such a hat, that person must
"97 One method for mitigating the Rosenthal effect is through the use of a "blank
lineup" in which a witness to a crime is shown two lineups, one of which has the suspect
in it and the other of which does not. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 878 F.2d 753, 755
(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 254 (1989). No one has ever suggested, however,
that blank lineups may be constitutionally required.
'" Compare Foster, 394 U.S. at 443 (showing suspect in two lineups is unconstitutional)
with United States v. Johnson, 859 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 1988) (showing defendant's
picture in two successive photo arrays was not suggestive) and United States v. Dowling,
855 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding procedure in which defendant's picture was
shown in three successive photo arrays), aff'd on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).
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be the one that the police suspect." The fact that the police had
not forced the defendant to wear the hat-winch was the salient
fact for the Coleman Court-is irrelevant to the witness's chain of
inference.
Since the proposed definition provides a relatively concrete
standard, it also would protect the police from after-the-fact crit-
icism by defense attorneys who assert that the police should have
noticed some distinguishing feature of the procedure, or that the
pictures were not sufficiently similar. 199 Rather than simply arguing
that the defendant was "too distinctive" or that he "stood out
from" the other pictures or lineup participants, the defendant's
attorney would have to argue that the witness had reason to believe,
when he viewed the pretrial identification procedure, that the police
believed that the defendant was the criminal. This is a relatively
narrower point, which should spare the police from some unfair
second guessing by defense counsel.
The proposed standard also provides guidance for police con-
ducting lineups. It supports a proposal, first made by Professor
Elizabeth Loftus, that a lineup may be said to be non-suggestive
if a reasonable person who did not witness the crime, but who
heard the same description of the assailant that the police heard
from the witness of the lineup, would pick each person m the
lineup with the same frequency 200 Professor Loftus's guide accords
perfectly with the proposed analysis of suggestiveness, for by fo-
cusing solely on what the witness told the police, it avoids extra-
neous and irrelevant factors about the lineup and concentrates on
the danger that the witness will infer what the police suspect instead
of simply recognizing a lineup participant. Professor Loftus's guide
would avoid the danger that the police use a pretrial identification
procedure simply to allow the witness to confirm what the witness
already knew, or that they signal to the witness that they believe
they have the assailant who fit the witness's description. It also
would protect the police from after-the-fact criticism by defense
attorneys who may assert that the police should have noticed some
199 See, e.g., Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893, 896 (1lth Cir. 1988) (rejecting defendant's
claim that photo array was suggestive because only the defendant's photo had height
markings m the background); United States v. Russo, 796 F.2d 1443, 1452 (1ith Cir. 1986)
(rejecting defendant's claim that photo array was suggestive because defendant's photo had
a yellow tint); United States v. Love, 746 F.2d at 479 (rejecting defendant's claim that
photo array was suggestive because some pictures were larger than others).
m See E. Lorus, supra note 3, at 145; see also Jonakait, supra note 196, at 526
(adopting Professor Loftus's view).
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distinguishing feature of the defendant even if the witness had not
mentioned it to them.
B. Unnecessarily Suggestive Procedures, the Right to Procedural
Fairness, and a Per Se Exclusionary Rule
Eyewitness identification evidence derived from pretrial proce-
dures may be divided into three types: evidence derived from
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, evidence derived from neces-
sarily suggestive procedures, and evidence derived from properly
conducted procedures. Different due process considerations apply
to the first type of eyewitness evidence than apply to the second
and third type of eyewitness evidence. In particular, considerations
of procedural fairness apply to evidence that is the product of
unnecessarily suggestive procedures.
The first part of the proposed right to due process is a per se
exclusion of evidence that is the product of unnecessarily suggestive
pretrial identification procedures. This part distinguishes between
necessarily and unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures
and thus respects the non-evidentiary values underlying the due
process clause and protects the defendant's right to fundamental
fairness.
The focus of the per se rule on the necessity of the harmful
procedure makes the rule analogous to due process rules that have
evolved in other areas. The question of necessity is an inquiry
about the state of mind of the police; in effect, the question is
whether the police could have conducted a non-suggestive proce-
dure and whether they acted negligently, recklessly, or intentionally
m conducting an unfair procedure. This inquiry is a familiar one
to courts, because the state of mind of state actors is often relevant
to the analysis of due process claims in other contexts. For exam-
ple, courts regularly seek to determine whether alleged deprivations
of property by the state are intentional or accidental, and the.due
process clause is implicated only if they are intentional. 201
This approach, in conjunction with the proposed definition of
suggestiveness, would bar some evidence that might be admissible
M See, e.g., Danel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1977) ("deprivation" of life,
liberty or property prohibited by the due process clause means intentional deprivation, not
negligent deprivation); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (equal protection clause protects against intentional discrimination,
not mere disproportionate impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (same);




under current law For example, because show-ups are unquestion-
ably suggestive under the proposed definition of suggestiveness,
evidence derived from them would be barred unless the police
could demonstrate that it was necessary to conduct a show-up
rather than a lineup. 2 2 Similarly, evidence derived from suggestive
lineups also would be barred because, if the police have the time
to conduct a lineup, they probably also have the time to conduct
it non-suggestively This approach would have no effect on prop-
erly conducted, non-suggestive procedures or on procedures that
are unavoidably suggestive.
The exclusion of evidence derived from unnecessarily suggestive
procedures is an appropriate method of protecting the defendant
and punishing the government for its procedurally unfair actions.
As noted above, exclusion was the remedy contemplated by Stovall,
and it is consistent with Stovall's companion cases, United States
v Wade and Gilbert v California, which applied a per se rule of
exclusion to pretrial identifications obtained from procedures when
the defendant's right to counsel was violated. 20 3
One objection to the per se rule is that it would keep out
potentially reliable evidence.2°4 But in this, the proposed rule is no
different from any other constitutional rule protecting the criminal
defendant. Simply put, unfair procedures, like any other kind of
unconstitutional action by the government, require the exclusion
of evidence obtained thereby, regardless of the reliability of the
evidence. The rule is hardly draconian: the admission into evidence
of an in-court identification after an unnecessarily suggestive pre-
trial procedure would not violate due process so long as the state
could demonstrate that the in-court identification had an inde-
pendent basis. The per se rule thus prevents the state from deriving
any evidence from its own wrongful acts, but does not prevent the
state from putting on a case. Finally, if a per se rule were enforced,
the police would soon stop using unnecessarily suggestive proce-
dures .205
Of course, if the standard of necessity were lax, as it was in Simmons, see supra
note 23, then the prohibition on unnecessarily suggestive procedures would be weak. A
stricter standard of necessity, such as that suggested in Stovall, see supra note 12, would
be more appropriate.
m See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text. It is also the rule currently applied
by the New York State Court of Appeals in the interpretation of the New York Constitu-
tion's own due process clause. See People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384, 440 N.Y.S.2d
902, 907 (N.Y. 1981).
1' See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
205 Id. at 126-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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A second objection is that the per se test is unnecessary because
the Manson reliability test sufficiently deters police from undertak-
ing unnecessarily suggestive procedures.2 The facts belie this ob-
jection: cases in which the police use suggestive procedures abound
in the lower courts and the state courts.2 And, as noted above,
lower courts usually do not weigh the suggestiveness of the pro-
cedure against the five Biggers and Manson reliability factors, but
simply consider those five factors alone if they find that the pretrial
procedure was suggestive. 208 Consequently, there is even less of a
deterrent against the use of suggestive procedures than there would
be if the courts followed Manson properly, because so long as the
five factors are satisfied, the police have nothing to lose by con-
ducting a suggestive pretrial procedure.
A further argument against the proposed per se rule may be
that it has little chance of being adopted by the Supreme Court
because the trend in recent years has been away from per se
exclusionary rules, and towards more flexible standards applicable
to police conduct.2 But, as discussed above, the right to due
process is different than other constitutional rights because inno-
cent defendants are the beneficiaries of the right; thus the due
process right may be treated differently from other rights without
fear of contradiction. Moreover, numerous state constitutions have
due process clauses that have been invoked in challenges to pretrial
identification procedures in state prosecutions. 210 The interpretation
of these states' constitutional provisions is not controlled by deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, and the state supreme
courts may interpret the due process clauses in state constitutions
more broadly than the Umted States Supreme Court has interpreted
the due process clause of the federal constitution. 21'
C. Reliability, Evaluability and Due Process
The two remaimng types of eyewitness identification evidence-
evidence derived from necessarily suggestive procedures and evi-
dence derived from properly conducted (i.e., non-suggestive) pre-
101 Id. at 112.
"7 See supra notes 102-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-149 and accompanying text.
O See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
210 See, e.g., Adams, 53 N.Y.2d at 251-52, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
211 See, e.g., id., see also Brennarr, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv L. REv. 489 (1977).
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trial procedures-do not raise any issue concermng the defendant's
right to procedural fairness. The problem of reliability remains,
however: the identification evidence may not be accurate and may
be overvalued by juries. This is a problem of constitutional dimen-
sion, for it is recognized that the defendant has a due process right
to have used against him only evidence that can be rationally
evaluated by the jury,2 2 and the introduction into evidence of
either of these types of testimony may infringe upon that right.
There are four measures most often suggested by commentators
by which courts nught avoid the danger that eyewitness identifi-
cation testimony will violate the defendant's right to have only
rationally evaluable evidence used against hum: 213 (1) excluding
unreliable identification evidence, (2) requiring corroboration of
any eyewitness identification testimony, (3) providing the jury with
cautionary jury instructions about the vagaries of eyewitness iden-
tification testimony, and (4) admitting the testimony of expert
witnesses about the vagaries of eyewitness identification testimony
These methods shall be considered in turn.
1. Excluding Unreliable Identification Evidence
The first method is essentially the one mandated by the Su-
preme Court in Manson v Brathwaite.21 4 It would require courts
to preview eyewitness testimony that is derived from pretrial iden-
tification procedures and assure that it passes a threshold of reli-
ability before it may be presented to the jury We have already
seen that the five-factor test is an inadequate method of previewing
the testimony; a better method, or "screen," could presumably be
developed by a better informed court, based upon more sound
scientific principles. It is beyond the. scope of this Article to provide
the details of the method. Plainly, the five-factor test would have
to be revised to, for example, eliminate the reference to the wit-
ness's confidence in her identification; the improved method also
would have to take into account additional relevant factors, such
212 See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv L. REv 567, 599 (1978) (citing authority).
213 See, e.g., E. LoFrus, supra note 3, at 187; Note, Eyewitness Identification Testi-
mony and the Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 WAsH. U.L.Q.
1387, 1400 (1983); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on
the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAr. L. REv. 969, 1000-28 (1977);
Weinstein, Book Review, 81 COLUM. L. Rv. 441, 454-55 (1981) (Judge Weinstein suggests
nine additional steps that nught increase the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence).
214 432 U.S. at 112.
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as whether the eyewitness and the defendants are of the same
race.
215
An improved method of evaluating the reliability of testimony
would enable the court to exclude testimony that had a low pro-
bative value-in effect, it would exclude those identifications that
the court believed were so likely to be wrong that they would be
nusleading or a waste of the jury's time to consider-and would
leave for the jury's consideration only such testimony as had more
than some muiumal probative value. Such a process would be a
substantial benefit to the promotion of justice. It serves no one's
interests to have misleading testimony before the jury, and the
process would help to avoid this from happemng.
This approach would not, however, be a sufficient response to
the problem of unreliable eyewitness evidence, no matter how
sophisticated the courts' screen. In the first place, as seen above,
courts are generally reluctant to keep evidence from juries for fear
of usurping their historical and constitutional role as weighers of
the evidence; 2 6 thus, the exclusion approach-even with a screen
of finely-woven mesh-would likely permit into evidence much
testimony that is only marginally probative. Moreover, because the
screen would serve the same exclusionary function as the law of
evidence, there is the continued danger of confusion between the
constitutional and evidentiary tests.217
A further problem with the exclusionary approach can be ap-
preciated by distinguising between two elements of reliability,
probativity and evaluability Probativity is the tendency of a piece
of evidence to prove the matter for which it is offered into evi-
dence; evaluability is the degree to which a jury can assess the
probativity of a piece of evidence. Probativity and evaluability are
not necessarily correlated; highly evaluable evidence may not be
highly probative, and vice versa. 218 Because juries consistently over-
state the probative value of eyewitness identification testimony, 21 9
211 See generally supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
218 For example, techmcally abstruse material may be highly probative but virtually
incomprehensible to the jury and thus not highly evaluable. On the other hand, the alibi
testimony of the defendant's friend or lover may have little probative value'on account of
the witness's special relationship with the defendant, but it could be highly evaluable because
the jury could easily weigh for itself the various factors that would lead it to believe or
disbelieve that testimony.
239 See Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy
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such testimony tends to have low evaluability The exclusionary
approach does not address this problem because it does not help
the jury evaluate the eyewitness testimony correctly Thus margin-
ally probative evidence that passed through the court's screen would
be presented to a jury that would systematically mistake it for
valuable and highly probative evidence.
2. Requiring Corroboration
Some commentators have suggested that eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony should not be admitted unless it can be corroborated
by non-eyewitness evidence supporting the identification.20 No court
has accepted this proposal, and it is unsound. As Judge Weinstein
has pointed out, a mandatory corroboration rule "raises the dif-
ficult issue of determining how much corroborating evidence is
enough."2' A corroboration requirement also would foster the
confusion already experienced by some courts between the consti-
tutional standard of reliability and the courts' own evaluation of
the probable guilt of the defendant.m- Moreover, it may be too
harsh, for an eyewitness identification may be probative, and. the
mandatory corroboration rule would exclude it on account of the
fortuity that there is no non-eyewitness corroborating evidence. "
Finally, like the screen approach, the mandatory corroboration
rule deals only with the probativeness of eyewitness evidence but
does not deal with the evaluability problem.
3. Using Cautionary Jury Instructions
Some commentators propose a right to due process according
to which, whenever eyewitness identification testimony derived from
pretrial identification procedures is admitted into evidence, the
defendant would be entitled to an instruction by the court to the
jury cautioning it about the vagaries and unreliability of eyewitness
of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HuM. BEaav 19 (1983); Wells, How Adequate is
Human Intuition for Judging Eyewitness Testimony?, in G. WELLS & E. LoFrus, supra
note 3, at 258.
See, e.g., E. Loirus, supra note 3, at 188-89; Comment, Possible Procedural
Safeguards Against Mistaken Identification by Eyewitnesses, 2 UCLA L. REv 552, 557
n.23 (1955).
221 Weinstein, supra note 213, at 454.
m See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
22 Id., see also Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?, supra note 213, at 1002.
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testimony 224 Such a cautionary instruction, it has been argued,
would permit the jury to evaluate the eyewitness evidence more
intelligently than it otherwise would, and would avoid the problem
of jury "overestimation" of the evidence that implicates the defen-
dant's right to reliability Several courts have permitted the use of
such instructions at the discretion of the trial court, -2 and a few
courts have held that such instructions are required as a matter of
due process. Unlike the screen approach and the mandatory
corroberation rule, mandatory jury instructions focus exclusively
on the problem of evaluability rather than probativity
Although the use of jury instructions would be a sound ad-
vance, it is questionable whether such instructions sufficiently pro-
tect the defendant against the dangers of eyewitness identification
evidence. In the first place, because judges are not experts in
psychology, their instructions cannot always explain all of the
various and subtle influences bearing on the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence. For example, the instruction approved in
the seminal case of cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness
evidence, United States v Telfaire, is little more than an admom-
tion to jurors to consider eyewitness evidence cautiously, and a
reminder of the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard. 227
As we have seen, there is much more detail and many more nuances
that must go into the proper evaluation of eyewitness identification
evidence. Even if the court's instruction is detailed, it might be
wrong: like jurors, judges who are not sophisticated about the
See, e.g., Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for Cautionary
Jury Instructions in Crminal Cases, supra note 213, at 1434; see also Saltzburg, A Special
Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of
Evidence, 66 CAiLF. L. REv. 1011, 1059-60 (1978) (concluding that instructions are better
than testimony about unreliability).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Lms, 835 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Thoma, 713 F.2d 604, 607-08 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984); United
States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30, 32 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976).
226 The courts that have mandated the use of cautionary jury instructions have not
articulated the legal foundation for their orders, but it appears to be the due process clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 555-58
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam). But see United States v. Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 670-71 (9th
Cir. 1977) (approving trial court's refusal to give restrictive charge on eyewitness identifi-
cation). One court required a cautionary jury instruction where the government's case rested
solely on questionable eyewitness identification evidence. United States v. Greene, 591 F.2d
471, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1979).
227 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558-59. This instruction has been adopted by courts in
other circuits. See, e.g., Holley, 502 F.2d at 275; Greene, 591 F.2d at 476-77.
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psychology of eyewitness identifications may follow their intuitions,
and instruct the jury incorrectly Finally, even a detailed and
techmcally correct jury instruction-coming as it does at the end
of the trial after all of the evidence has been heard-would prob-
ably not be sufficient because, by that time, the jury might have
made up its mnd about the evidence. 22 Additionally, studies have
found that juries do not understand most of the instructions that
they receive, especially techmcal and detailed ones,229 and a detailed
jury instruction about eyewitness testimony might well be beyond
the comprehension of most jurors. While the use of cautionary
instructions is an improvement over the current state of the law,
it is not enough.
4. Admitting Expert Testimony
The use of experts is the most frequently proposed reform for
courts' treatment of eyewitness identification evidence. 230 Until the
early 1980's, courts generally did not admit expert testimony about
eyewitness identificationsY 1 More recently, a growing number of
courts have admitted such testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702Y 2 No court, however, has recogmzed a constitutional
right to such testimony Such a constitutional right would entitle
the defendant to counter inculpatory eyewitness evidence that is
the product of a pretrial identification procedure by the testimony
of an expert witness on his behalf, and would impose upon the
state an obligation to provide identification experts to indigent
defendants.
See Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?, supra note 213, at 1005.
219 See Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J.
LEG3AL Sr=D. at 404 n.44 (citing authority).
"0 See, e.g., E. Lonrus, supra note 3, at 191-203; Katz & Reid, Expert Testimony on
the Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification, 1 CA. JUST. J. 177, 197-206 (1977); Note, Did
Your Eyes Deceive You?, supra note 213, at 1008-14 (citing authority).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383-84 (Ist Cir. 1979), United
States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979);
United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100
(1977); United States v. Amaral, 448 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973). It is iromc that some
courts based their exclusion of expert testimony on the ground that expert testimony about
the unreliability of eyewitness evidence did not have an adequate scientific basis, see, e.g.,
United States v. Amaral, even after the Supreme Court endorsed the- "well-recogmzed
unreliability" of eyewitness evidence in Wade.
232 See, e.g., United States v. Dowmng, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3rd Cir. 1985); State v.
Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 803 (Ohio 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 81 (1986).
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The due process right to expert testimony is based upon the
case of Ake v Oklahoma,23 in which the Supreme Court held that
indigent criminal defendants are entitled as a matter of due process
to the assistance of a psychiatrist, at state expense, if they prove
that their sanity will be a significant factor at their trial.2 4 Applying
the balancing test of Mathews v Eldridge,25 the Court held that
the state's interest in limiting expenditures of criminal trials was
far outweighed by the private interest in a fair outcome of a
proceeding in which life or liberty are at stake and the public
interest in the fair adjudication of criminal cases. 236 Of paramount
importance to the Court was the risk that the issue of sanity might
be decided incorrectly without expert testimony 237
Ake's reasoning applies with full force in the case of expert
eyewitness testimony The psychological evidence demonstrates that
without expert testimony, juries tend to overvalue the reliability of
eyewitness testimony and may reach incorrect decisions on the basis
of such testimony, which imperil the defendant's life or liberty It
further demonstrates that expert testimony could aid juries consid-
erably in avoiding such errors,2 s and it appears that no other
method would aid the jury in accurately evaluating the eyewitness
identification testimony as much as expert testimony Just as these
factors compelled the Supreme Court in Ake to recognize a due
process right to a psychiatrist on the issue of sanity, they compel
with equal force the recognition of a due process right to expert
testimony on the issue of. eyewitness testimony
Recognizing the due process right to expert testimony would
enhance the jury's ability to fulfill its role of evaluator of the
evidence because it would enable the jury to evaluate the evidence
- 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
'' Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-83 (1985). The Court also held that a defendant
is entitled to a psychiatrist at state expense m a capital sentencing proceeding if the
prosecution introduces evidence about the defendant's future dangerousness. Id.
-5 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Ake, 470 U.S. at 82.
" Id. at 77.
23 See Loftus, The Impact of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 65 J. App. PsycH. 9, 14 (1980); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive
You?, supra note 213, at 1010; see also Brigham and Bothwell, supra note 219, at 29
("[Tihe testimony of an expert on [eyewitness identification] matters would aid the
jury in its evaluation of evidence and would thereby further the cause of justice."); Hosch,
Beck & McIntire, Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury
Decisions, 4 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 287 (1980); Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert
Psychological Advice on Human Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Iden-
tifications, 4 L. & HuM. BEHAv 275 (1980).
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more accurately than it would otherwise be able to do. After
hearing the expert testimony, the jury may make a more sophisti-
cated determination of reliability than the court, unaided by such
testimony, would, for expert testimony could delve into all of the
several factors that may affect the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony in a particular case. Neither the Biggers and Manson test
nor any model jury instruction could be as flexible or accurate.
Some would argue that the right to expert testimony should be
limited to psychiatric experts testifying about the defendant's san-
ity The two bases of this argument are that (1) the issue of sanity
is so complicated that, without expert testimony, jurors could not
properly evaluate it, and (2) the issue of sanity is a "threshold"
issue, because if a defendant was insane at the time of the crime,
then she cannot be constitutionally punished for it.
The proposed limitation would be unfounded. In the first place,
although it is true that sanity is a complicated issue on which
expert guidance may aid juries, the same is true of eyewitness
identification. Although jurors may reach intuitive conclusions about
eyewitness testimony that they might not reach about the issue of
sanity, those intuitive conclusions may be wrong and harmful to
the defendant.239 Thus expert testimony is at least as important in
the case of eyewitness identifications as it is in the case of testimony
about a defendant's sanity Second, although the issue of the
defendant's sanity is indeed a critical issue, the accuracy of eye-
witness testimony is no less important: an innocent defendant may
be convicted on the basis of eyewitness testimony, the unreliability
of which cannot be discerned by the jury Finally, the proposed
limitation is unsupported in the caselaw, for inferior federal courts
both before and after Ake have recognized a due process right to
non-psychiatric experts. 240 And in the case of Caldwell v Missis-
2" See also Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?, supra note 213, at 1017 n.224 (data
conflicts with belief on effects of stress, etc. on reliability).
m Before Ake: Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir. 1980) ("There
can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert
witness. Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now
considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system."); Mason v. Arizona, 504
F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (due process requires appointment of investigative assistance
for indigent defendants), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704
F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir. 1983) (state must furmsh psychiatric or psychological experts
to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to
prove mitigating circumstances). After Ake: Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-44
(8th Cir. 1987) (hypnosis); see also Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 740-42 (11th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part in an opimon joined by
five other judges) (Ake should apply to non-psychiatric experts).
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slppl,ul decided just three months after Ake, the Supreme Court
rejected a defendant's contention that he had a due process right
to a cnrimnal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics
expert. The grounds for the decision were not that the defendant
could not have a right to such experts, but that he had not made
a sufficient showing of need, because he had "offered little more
than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be
beneficial." 2 This suggests that the Supreme Court was willing to
extend the principle of Ake to apply to non-psychiatric experts if
there had been a proper showing of need.2 3
One might further object that recognizing the proposed right
would significantly increase the cost to the state of criminal trials.
Because eyewitness identification evidence is more prevalent than
the insanity defenses, this argument runs, providing eyewitness
identification experts would be more expensive than providing ex-
perts on sanity
This argument must be treated with caution because unreliable
eyewitness identification evidence threatens a goal of signal impor-
tance to our criminal procedures, the protection of innocent people,
and preserving that goal is worth a considerable cost. Nevertheless,
if giving every defendant a right to an expert whenever eyewitness
identification evidence was entered against him would impose an
excessive cost on society, then the right to an expert could be
limited in its scope. One refinement might be to differentiate
between those defendants who have been subjected to a suggestive
pretrial identification procedure and those who have not. The
former would be automatically entitled to an expert, while the
latter would be entitled to an expert only if they could demonstrate
with particularity how an expert would help the jury to interpret
the eyewitness identification testimony This would lessen the num-
ber of cases in which experts were used, while giving defendants
an unqualified constitutional right to an expert's assistance in
-, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
212 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323-24 n.1 (1985).
241 The only post-Ake case that has considered whether a defendant had a due process
right to an expert witness on the unreliability of eyewitness identification found that the
defendant did not have such a nght. See Johnson v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1479, 1485-86
(lIth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987). The Johnson Court did not even mention
Ake, and based its decision on the grounds that the evaluation of eyewitness identification
evidence was "merely [a] matter] of common sense, well within the ordinary experience of
a jury." Id. at 1486. This finding is contrary to the growing body of scientific evidence
and to the increasing trend of judicial decisions that find that expert testimony about
eyewitness identification satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
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situations where the danger of unreliable evidence is greatest. It is
also consistent with Caldwell's requirement that a defendant must
make a showing that the help of an expert would aid her case.2
A third objection is that recognizing a due process right to an
eyewitness identification expert would open the. door for expert
witnesses in a multitude of other situations where they may not be
warranted: if experts are constitutionally required in cases of eye-
witness identifications, this argument runs, then they also might be
constitutionally required in numerous other situations where there
is technical or potentially misleading evidence, and criminal trials
would bog down into "wars of the experts."
But eyewitness evidence is different from most other types of
evidence precisely because juries consistently tend to overvalue it.
Thus, eyewitness evidence is more dangerous to defendants than
many other types of evidence, and the due process argument that
applies to eyewitness identification may not apply with equal strength
to other types of evidence. Moreover, the danger that this argument
foresees is really not a danger at all. Simply put, we live in a
society in which science illummates many parts of our life and
yields surprises about matters-like eyewitness identification-that
were once thought to be straightforward and common sense.
CONCLUSION
Since its uncertain beginnings in Stovall v Denno, the right to
due process in connection with pretrial identification procedures
has been whittled down by the Supreme Court and treated almost
offhandedly and casually by the lower federal courts and the state
courts. Consequently, it is extremely weak and doctrinally con-
fused. And, because of its exclusive focus on reliability, the right
fails to protect the value of procedural fairness, which the Supreme
Court has clearly indicated it is the role of the due process clause
to protect.
The proposed formulation of the right to due process in con-
nection with pretrial identification procedures is intended to remedy
the deficiencies of the current formulation of the right. To sum-
marize, it provides that (1) eyewitness identification testimony that
-4 See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323-24 n.l. This approach also is consistent with other
authority. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (For a defendant to
have a due process right to an expert "the defendant must show the trial court that there
exists a reasonable probability both that an expert would be of assistance to the defense
and that denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.").
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is the product of unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedures is per
se inadmissible (with suggestiveness being accorded the definition
proposed in Part III.A. of this Article), and (2) eyewitness identi-
fication testimony that is derived from other pretrial identification
procedures-either necessarily suggestive ones or non-suggestive
ones-may be admitted if it passes a scientifically sound threshold
test for probativity and the defendant has a right to counter it
with expert testimony
There are two final points, the first concerning the breadth of
the proposed right to due process and the second concerning its
necessity.
First, it may be argued that the right to due process in con-
nection with pretrial identification procedures should be expanded
to become a right to due process in connection with eyewitness
identification testimony generally Eyewitness identification testi-
mony that is not derived from pretrial identification procedures-
that is, eyewitness testimony given by a witness whose only viewing
of the assailant was at the scene of the crime-may be just as
untrustworthy as other eyewitness testimony,2 5 and may be sim-
larly overvalued by the jury Thus, the defendant may have an
equally strong argument for a due process right to expert testimony
in such cases as he does where the testimony is derived from a
pretrial identification procedureY56 Although this Article does not
explore that argument, it has merit and deserves further consider-
ation. This Article confined its analysis to the right to due process
in connection with eyewitness identification evidence derived from
pretrial identification procedures simply because that is how the
Supreme Court has constructed the right.
Secondly, some commentators appear to believe that there is
no need for a right to due process in connection with pretrial
identification procedures. These commentators argue that (a) sug-
gestive procedures undermine accurate evidence, and (b) the police
are presumably interested in obtaining only accurate evidence-for
that is the only. kind of evidence that helps them to do their job,
24 See Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?, supra note 213, at 994 -("Suggestive
procedures used to facilitate identification of the accused are only a minor cause of
unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Problems of perception and memory can often play a
far greater role in producing an maccurate identification.").
- The defendant confronted by eyewitness identification testimony that is not derived
from any pretrial identification procedure would not have any argument from procedural
fairness, of course, but only an argument from his right not to have particularly unreliable
and unevaluable evidence used against him.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
which is capturing guilty people and deterring crime-therefore (c)
the police do not need a constitutional rule to compel them to
conduct proper pretrial identification procedures. According to one
commentator, "[t]he mystery is why the police should need addi-
tional incentives [imposed by the due process clause] to avoid use
of unreliable identification testimony "247 The answer to this ar-
gument is that, although the police should, perhaps, not conduct
suggestive identification procedures,2 the undemable fact is that
they do conduct such objectionable procedures every day As a
consequence, the criminal defendant's right to due process is vio-
lated. That right should be strengthened, not abandoned.
- Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of
Crime Control, supra note 121, at 327; see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112
n.12 (1977) ("The interest in obtaining convictions of the guilty also urges police to adopt
procedures that show the resulting identification to be accurate. Suggestive procedures often
will vitiate the weight of the evidence at trial and the jury may tend to discount such
evidence.").
24 One possible explanation for the apparently irrational behavior of the police is that
the police believe that they are able to achieve the goal of crime-deterrence without going
to the effort and expense of conducting correct procedures. This explanation is offered by
Professor Seidman. See Seidman, supra note 121, at 328.
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